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IN THE  SECOND  HALF  of the 1980s,  after strenuous  efforts, Mexico was 
coming  to be viewed as a showcase of successful stabilization  and eco- 
nomic reform, institutional  stability, and financial  predictability.  Mex- 
ico was becoming  what Chile already  had become and what all of Latin 
America hoped to be. But the Chiapas uprising, the assassination of 
presidential  candidate  Luis Donaldo  Colosio, the ensuing  muddle  about 
his succession, and  the sheer fact of an election year have raised  doubts 
about Mexico's ability to achieve lasting stability. By April 1994, the 
sharp  upturn  in interest rates, arising  from speculative attacks on the 
peso, suggested that a far too optimistic view may have been taken of 
Mexico's future.  The Mexican  economy had  come to a virtual  standstill. 
Per  capita  income is now far below what it was in 1980,  as shown in fig- 
ure 1, and  from 1992  to 1993  it fell by 1.2  percent.  Moreover,  any positive 
growth  that  may  occur, in 1994,  will have been fueled  by fiscal  expansion 
not by strength  in the real  economy. 
This paper argues that Mexico suffers from a failure  to accompany 
the stabilization  of inflation,  shown in figure  2, and  the impressive  array 
of economic  reforms  with not only true  political  reform  but  also true  eco- 
nomic  progress.  The stabilization  strategy  has led to an overvaluation  of 
the exchange  rate, a precarious  financial  situation,  and  a lack of growth. 
Real  interest  rates  paid  by firms  continue  to be very high, nonperforming 
loans have been increasing, and the current account deficit stands at 
more  than  $20  billion. 
Arguably,  the lack of growth  may  reflect  the costs of transition,  as the 
massive  restructuring  causes expansion  in some industries  and  contrac- 
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Figure 1.  Per Capita GDP in Mexico,  1970-93 
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a.  Inflation rate measured  as  the  change  in the current month's  consumer  price  level  over  the  level  12 months 
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tion in others, with the balance expected  to shift soon toward expansion 
as the rewards of reform cumulate into sustained high growth. The more 
pessimistic  view,  however,  is that just as in Chile in the late 1970s posi- 
tive,  sustainable growth will come  only after the overvaluation  is cor- 
rected. 
Of course,  whether  an overvaluation  exists  is controversial.  Until 
very recently,  the level of interest rates and capital inflows did not sug- 
gest a problem at all. During the past few  years the country  has been 
flooded  with capital inflows,  and the passage  of the  North  American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has only bolstered that trend. This av- 
alanche of capital has strengthened the currency in real terms-which  is 
the expected  effect  of an inward transfer. In other words,  if a country 
borrows to invest,  real appreciation accompanies  the high level  of re- 
source absorption, more so if deep reform opens up large, lasting oppor- 
tunities. The credit rating has also been improving steadily, with the cost 
of capital falling by 150 basis points since the passage of NAFTA  (Sep- 
tember 1993 to December  1993). 
This positive  take on recent developments  is articulated by Mexican 
policymakers whenever they are challenged about the economy's  direc- 
tion. Guillermo Ortiz, for example,  argues, 
It is true  that the Mexican  currency  has appreciated,  but such a fact is far  from 
implying  a strong  devaluation  of the currency.  That  depends  on the equilibrium 
of the real  exchange  rate,  which  is difficult  to calculate,  adding  to the fact  that  the 
peso had undergone  a strong  devaluation  before the current  stabilization  effort 
started,  which probably  made it undervalued....  the appreciation  process is 
a natural,  and not necessarily negative, consequence of the reform  process in 
Mexico.  ' 
Less sanguine observers argue that the financial flows may be fragile, 
however.  The flows  are financing not only investment  but also a high 
level of consumption and intermediate goods imports, with the large ex- 
ternal deficit dampening demand for domestic  goods.  For full employ- 
ment to occur, then, crowding-in is required (through an increase in the 
demand for domestic production). According to this argument, trade lib- 
eralization, which was an important part of recent reform, should have 
been accompanied by real depreciation not appreciation.  To a large ex- 
tent, we agree real depreciation is needed to improve the long-term eco- 
nomic prospects of Mexico and secure the benefits of economic  reform. 
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Table 1.  Long-Run Economic Performance of Mexico,  1955-93 
Percent per year 
Consinmer 
Real per  price 
Period  capita  GDP  inflationa 
1955-72  3.1  3.9 
1972-81  3.6  20.6 
1981-88  -  2.0  86.2 
1988-92  1.5  21.1 
1993  -  1.2  9.7 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  Initernlationial  Finianicial Statistics  and  unpublished  data  from  Instituto 
Nacional  de Estadistica,  Geograffa, e lnformaci6n  (INEGI). 
a.  Year average  over  previous  year's  average. 
Historical Background 
From the mid-1950s to the 1970s, Mexico  was a paragon of financial 
stability  and growth.  The exchange  rate against the dollar was  fixed; 
convertibility  was unrestricted; inflation was moderate; and growth of 
real per capita income was high. Table 1 traces the long-run growth and 
inflation performance of the Mexican economy. 
The stability ended with the oil price increases  of the 1970s because 
of fiscal extravagance resulting from dramatic increases in revenue from 
oil exports.  With added room in the budget, policies  became  highly ex- 
pansionary,  the currency  became  overvalued,  government  borrowing 
increased,  and capital flight began. A huge increase in government debt 
and the collapse  of the financial system,  as well as the exchange  rate, 
soon followed.  Mexico became insolvent in 1982-the  first of the debtor 
countries to do so-and  shifted to a regime of debt restructuring, which 
culminated in the  1990 Brady plan agreements  brokered by then-U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Nicholas  Brady. As a result of the Brady plan and 
the reforms that accompanied it, voluntary lending returned earlier than 
expected  and  in  large  amounts.2  We  detail  the  key  areas  of  reform 
below. 
Return to Voluntary Lending 
In the period leading up to  1982, Mexico  accumulated  an external 
debt amounting to 49 percent of gross domestic product. The accumula- 
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Table 2.  Mexican Debt and Transfers,  1982 and 1992 
Percent of GDP,  except  as noted 
Indicator  1982  1992 
External debt  49.0  32.0 
Resource  transfera  5.4  - 5.3 
Reservesb  1.8  19.3 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  based  on data from Banco  de Mexico  (1993); Aspe  (1993); and Salinas de Gortari 
(1993). 
a.  Noninterest  current account  surplus as percent of GDP. 
b.  Billions of U.S.  dollars at end of year. 
tion was mostly due to large current account imbalances.  But, in addi- 
tion,  the  growing  currency  overvaluation  and  financial  turmoil-in- 
cluding exchange control and bank nationalizations-meant  that capital 
flight became  an important additional factor in running up the external 
debt. The picture was completed  by extremely  high U.S.  interest rates, 
which led to large debt service financed by more borrowing. 
However,  just  like  Germany  during the  Weimar republic,  Mexico 
never paid much of what looked,  in 1985, like a crushing debt service 
burden. Early involuntary bank lending and credits from multilateral in- 
stitutions reduced the crisis.  And since  1989, Mexico  has had access  to 
international borrowing-in  fact, foreign investors  have eagerly sought 
Mexican government debt in pesos and dollars, and Mexican firms have 
borrowed in the world market. Mexico's  external position is described 
in table 2. 
As mentioned above,  the turning point in Mexican external financing 
was  the  Brady plan.  Until  that time,  multilateral institutions  and the 
U.S.  Treasury  held  the  firm view  that debt  forgiveness  would  have 
highly adverse consequences  for debtors and creditors alike. Many felt 
that banks were in a poor position to recognize the capital losses  and that 
debtors' creditworthiness  would be tarnished for a long time if they did 
not meet their obligations.  But the Brady plan was able to remove  the 
debt issue from the agenda and shift attention to reform and moderniza- 
tion. This shift, in Mexico  and elsewhere  in Latin America,  broke the 
ground for Mexico's  return to world capital markets and for direct in- 
vestment in the country. 
The Brady plan improved Mexico's  ability to service its external debt 
by reducing the interest  and principal payments  it had to make.3 The 
3.  See Claessens,  Oks, and van Wijnbergen (1994). 258  Brookings Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Table 3.  Net Capital Inflows into Mexico,  1989-92 
Billions of U.S.  dollars 
Type of 
investment  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Portfolio  -1.7  5.9  19.6  21.1 
Direct  2.6  2.5  4.7  5.4 
Source:  Initernzationial  Finatnacial  Statistics. 
yield spread in the international  market  between Mexican public debt 
and industrial  country debt of comparable  maturity  fell from 820 basis 
points in 1989  to about 200 basis points in the first  half of 1993.4  The im- 
provement  cannot  be fully attributed  to the debt  reduction  scheme, how- 
ever. Some credit also goes to the macroeconomic  reforms  undertaken 
by Mexico, as well as the large  reduction  in world  interest  rates, which 
alleviated  the debt service burden.  The trends  in voluntary  capital  flows 
are shown in table 3. In 1988,  capital  was still flowing  out of Mexico; in 
1989, inflows barely reached $0.9 billion. But by 1992, two years after 
the Brady plan, they amounted  to almost $26.5 billion; and in just the 
first  three quarters  of 1993,  capital  inflows  totaled  $22  billion. 
Improving  prospects in the private sector along with an increase in 
the worldwide  flow of capital  toward  emerging  markets  were other im- 
portant  causes of rising  capital  inflows, as private  borrowing  and  equity 
financing  began to replace government  borrowing  in the capital mar- 
kets.5  The resulting  boom in the stock market  was both an effect and a 
cause of the inflows-the  flows helped boost the market, which at- 
tracted still more capital. The stock market  rose 125 percent in 1991, 
about  25 percent  in 1992,  and almost 50 percent  in 1993.  The capital  in- 
flows also led to an accumulation  of reserves and a steady decline in in- 
terest rates. 
Thus far, direct investment has been relatively small, but it is ex- 
pected to increase  with NAFTA's passage. One private  forecast, for ex- 
ample,  envisages a near-doubling  of the rate  of private  direct  investment 
in 1994.6  There  is no reason  to believe that  with a stable and  competitive 
economy Mexico is not capable  of attracting  a very substantial  inflow  of 
4.  See IMF (1993, p. 64). 
5.  See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993a, 1993b). 
6.  See Centro de Analisis e Investigaci6n  Econ6mica  (1994, p. 19). Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Alejandro  Werner  259 
capital. By way of comparison, between  1982 and 1990, after Spain's en- 
try into the Common Market, direct foreign investment  in that country 
increased from 0.8 percent to 2.1 percent of GDP.7 
Waves of excitement  in supplying developing  countries  with capital 
are not unprecedented.  The historical record can lend some perspective 
to the present upswing in capital inflows. Taussig describes the usual se- 
quence of events, 
The loans from the creditor country  .  .  . begin with modest  amounts and pro- 
ceed crescendo. They are likely to be made  in exceptionally  larger  amounts  to- 
ward  the culminating  stage of a period  of activity  and speculative  upswing,  and 
during  that stage become larger  from month  to month so long as the upswing 
continues. With the advent of crisis, they are at once cut down sharply,  even 
cease entirely.  The interest  payments  on the old loans thereupon  are no longer 
offset by any new loans; they become instantly  a net charge  to be met by the 
borrowing  country.  A sudden  reversal  takes place in the debtor  country's  inter- 
national  balance  sheet; it feels the consequences  abruptly,  in an immediate  need 
of increased  remittances  to the creditor  country, in a strain  on its banks, high 
rates of discount, falling prices. And this train of events may ensue not only 
once. . . .8 
Taussig's  view understates  the potential trouble in Mexico.  The for- 
eign portfolio capital invested  in the Mexican money market, as well as 
investments  in  stocks,  is  highly  liquid.  Moreover,  there  is  not  only 
scheduled debt service but also a very large trade deficit that is financed 
by borrowing abroad. 
Perhaps Mexico  will prove Taussig  wrong,  however,  and the usual 
pattern of excess  lending and subsequent  crisis is not relevant.  But for 
this time to be different, there would have to be fundamental and irre- 
versible change in the debtor country to warrant the sustained large in- 
flows. Today,  the possibility  of such change is much greater than it has 
ever been before. 
Budget  Correction and Privatization 
Budget consolidation  was a central part of Mexican stabilization and 
reform. Here, Mexico  pursued three objectives:  a major cut in govern- 
ment spending; tax reform to increase the tax base, efficiency,  and com- 
pliance; and privatization of state-owned  enterprises.  On the spending 
side, investment expenditures were cut by 5 percent of GDP. On the rev- 
7.  Calculated using the data reported in International Financial  Statistics. 
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Table  4.  Mexican  Budget  and Debt, 1982-92 
Percent  of GDP 
Indicator  1982  1983  1992a 
Budget surplus 
Totalb  -16.9  -8.6  0.5 
Operationalc  -5.5  0.4  3.6 
Primaryd  -7.3  4.2  5.6 
Taxes  8.7  8.4  12.2 
Debt 
Domestic  15.5  16.5  10.1 
Foreign  35.8  43.7  16.4 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on Banco  de Mdxico  (1993). 
a. Numbers  exclude  revenues  from  privatization. 
b. Public  sector borrowing  requirements. 
c.  Public  sector  borrowing  requirements  adjusted  by the inflationary  component  of interest  payments  on domestic 
debt. 
d. Public  sector borrowing  requirements  plus interest  payments  on government  debt. 
Figure  3. Mexican  Public  Debt, 1980-92 
Percent  of GDP 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on Banco  de MExico  (1993). 
enue side, during  1982-92, the tax yield was raised  by 4 percent  of GDP 
even while marginal  tax rates were reduced. Table 4 reports  some gen- 
eral trends  in the budget. 
This extraordinary  reduction  in the operational  budget  deficit-9  per- 
cent of GDP, or the equivalent  of three Gramm-Rudman  cuts, as many 
Mexicans  put it-set  the stage for Mexico's strategy  of disinflation,  im- Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner  261 
Table  5. State  Enterprises  in Mexico, 1982-92 
Indicator  1982  1986  1992 
Number  of enterprises  1,155  737  217 
Employmenta  886.2  1,028.0  530.6 
Sources:  IWifornme  Hacetndario, October-December  (1993, p. 27); and unpublished government  data from INEGI. 
a.  Thousands. 
proved confidence in the currency, and ultimately lowered interest 
rates. With primary  surpluses averaging  5.3 percent of GDP over the 
1983-92 period, the debt-to-GDP  ratio declined, as shown in figure 3, 
even though  growth  was very slow or negative. 
Privatization  was a key part  of the public  finance  reforms.  The large 
government  deficits could be most effectively controlled  by either sell- 
ing off firms  or simply  closing them. If a firm  were unprofitable,  closing 
it cut the drain on government resources. If a firm were potentially 
profitable,  revenues from its sale could help improve  public  finance  by 
reducing  the cost of financing  the public  debt. Table  5 describes  the posi- 
tion of state enterprises  in Mexico over the past decade. 
Privatization  also played  a role in drawing  foreign  attention  to invest- 
ment  opportunities  in Mexico and  fueling  the external  financing  of Mexi- 
can reform. It acted as a galvanizing  force at a time when low interest 
rates in the United States had created  a willing  group  of investors. 
Trade Reform 
Among the specific macroeconomic  reforms  undertaken  by Mexico 
was trade  reform.  Table  6 shows the trade  liberalization  that  occurred  in 
the 1980s.  Average  tariff  rates declined, as did the dispersion  of rates. 
The tariff reductions particularly  apply to consumer goods. In this 
Table  6. Tariff  Levels  in Mexico, 1982-92 
Percent 
Tariff  statistic  1982  1986  1992 
Average  tariff  27.0  22.6  13.1 
Trade-weighted  average  16.4  13.1  11.1 
Tariff  dispersion  24.8  14.1  4.5 
Import  quota cover ratea  100.0  28.0  11.0 
Source:  General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (1993, vol.  1, p. 74, and vol.  2, p. 51). 
a.  Percentage  of total value of imports subject to quantitative restrictions. 262  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
category, the average  tariff  declined from 60 percent in 1983-84  to less 
than 20 percent in 1992.  For intermediate  and capital  goods, the initial 
level was about  20 percent  and  hence the liberalization  was more  moder- 
ate. Import  quotas, which were pervasive in the 1980s, are now nearly 
gone.9  Far  bolder  than  these measures  will be the complete  liberalization 
of trade  in goods and services to occur in North America  over the next 
15  years in accordance  with NAFTA. 
Factors behind the Real Exchange Rate Appreciation 
We now turn  to alternative  interpretations  of the real exchange rate 
appreciation  in Mexico. One view emphasizes the prosperity  and new 
opportunities  brought  about by the appreciation.  The other recognizes 
the improvements  but argues  that the manner  in which the stabilization 
was accomplished  sowed the seeds of an overvaluation  that  is becoming 
a source of speculative  instability.  As we argue  below, the interaction  of 
two major  policy steps bears  much  of the responsibility  for the overvalu- 
ation:  nominal  exchange  rate stabilization  and incomes policy. 
As mentioned  earlier,  Mexico has experienced  a huge real apprecia- 
tion in its exchange rate over the past few years. The dramatic  trade 
opening  of the 1980s  has thus been accompanied  by a rise in the relative 
price of Mexican  goods, and a large  external  deficit has emerged. Real 
interest rates have declined over the past few years but remain  excep- 
tionally  high. GDP growth  has been negligible.  The combined  evidence 
suggests that demand  has shifted to foreign  goods and that the growth- 
reducing  effect of real appreciation  has been aggravated  by a high real 
cost of credit. 
Figures 4-6 show Mexico's trade balance, current  account, and im- 
port  penetration.  They leave no doubt  of a major  deterioration  since the 
mid-1980s.  The current  account deficit has risen to almost 7 percent of 
GDP,  a very high  number  for a developing  country.  And the external  de- 
terioration  would have been even worse without the strong export 
growth of recent years. In the 1985-92 period, exports increased by 
about  75 percent,  as imports  tripled  .'0 As a result  of this imbalance,  lack 
of financing  is becoming  a real issue. The trade  liberalization  previously 
9. See General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (1993, vol. 1, pp. 74-75, and vol. 2, 
pp. 50-51). 
10. More  exactly, imports  increased  by 238  percent  and  total  exports  by 73 percent. Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner  263 
Figure 4.  Mexican Trade Balance,  1975-93 
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Source:  Banco  de Mexico,  Itidicadores  Econ6mnicos, various  issues. 
a.  The amount plotted  is the figure for each  quarter. 
Figure 5.  Mexican Current Account,  1970-93 
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Figure 7.  Mexico-U.S.  Relative Price Levels,  1970-93 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on Initerniatiotnal  Finiancial Statistics. 
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Table 7.  Competitiveness Measures for Mexico,  1989-93 
Units  as indicated 
Measitre  1989  1990  1992  1993 
Wages in dollarsa  1.58  1.64  2.35  2.65 
J.P.  Morgan indexb  108  100  108  117 
Banco  de Mexico  indexc  88  92  109  112 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  unpublished  data from the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics;  Banco  de 
Mexico  (1993); Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (various  issues). 
a.  Hourly compensation  in manufacturing in dollars. 
b.  J.P.  Morgan multilateral real effective  exchange  rate index in nonfood  manufacturing,  1990= 100. 
c.  Real exchange  rate index  based on the unit labor costs  in manufacturing,  1985= 100. 
discussed  is one  reason  for the  large increase  in imports and import 
penetration-strong  growth  clearly  is  not-but  real appreciation  can 
be held accountable  for the trade deterioration,  too.  It has reinforced 
the  trade  pattern by  making  imports  cheaper  and  restricting  export 
expansion. 
There are a number of measures of the real exchange  rate. We show 
the least elaborate one in figure 7: producer prices in Mexico relative to 
those in the United States, as measured in a common currency. The fig- 
ure makes it apparent that since  1987 the real exchange  rate has steadily 
appreciated to today's  historic high. The rate is even  higher than at its 
pinnacle before  the currency  collapse  in  1982. Of course,  there is no 
good benchmark date against which to judge the current levels,  and cer- 
tainly a moment of maximum distress,  such as  1982 or 1986, is not an 
appropriate starting point. On the other hand, a real exchange  rate that 
is higher than ever before is suspicious,  even  when major reforms and 
access  to capital justify  some real appreciation. 
Table 7 shows  several real exchange rate measures.  Even if the U.S. 
comparison  were  inconclusive,  each  of  these  numbers tells  a similar 
story. By all measures,  prices in Mexico,  on a dollar basis,  have risen 
relative to those in the rest of the world. Moreover,  except for the mini- 
devaluation  at the beginning of  1994, the process  continues:  the J.P. 
Morgan index reached  121.7 in January 1994, compared  with its  1990 
(base year) level of 100. 
Other  aspects  of  the  domestic  economy  are  also  relevant  here. 
Growth has been slow and came to a halt in 1993. Figure 8 shows  that 
(formal) employment  has  been  falling  and that industrial production 
since  1992 is at best flat. The evidence  on production confirms the evi- 
dence gleaned from prices: something is awry in the Mexican economy. 266  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Figure 8.  Industrial Production and Employment in Mexico,  1988-93 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  based on the industrial production index from Intertiationial Finiancial Statistics  and 
employment  figures from Data Resources,  Inc. 
a.  Indexes  are constructed  using three-month  moving averages  of the data. 
Two explanations for this evidence  are offered by the more optimistic 
observers.  First, it is asserted  that reform, modernization,  and the re- 
turn to world capital markets (reinforced by the institutionalization that 
NAFTA  is bringing) have changed the equilibrium prices of labor and 
assets.  And the fact that prices have increased so much is not surprising, 
since Mexico  has come from the deep troughs of 1982 and 1986 to very 
high peaks. This view stresses  that Mexican reforms have been spectac- 
ular, lasting, and the envy of any reform economy.  In other words, these 
observers argue that real appreciation should not be confused with over- 
valuation. 
A related but more moderate view concedes  that Mexico has a growth 
problem but that it is only transitory. Some firms are contracting as they 
adjust to the new and forward-looking  equilibrium real exchange  rate, 
while  other firms are expanding  to  meet  new  opportunities.  Increas- 
ingly,  in  their  view,  the  expansion  will  come  to  dominate  the  con- 
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Theoretical Approaches to the Exchange Rate Problem 
We now examine these different assertions  using two theoretical ap- 
proaches to the exchange  rate question.  One clarifies what to expect  in 
an equilibrium model from the various reforms, identifying in particular 
the effects  of liberalizing trade and capital flows on the real exchange 
rate.  The other  model  looks  at the  mechanics  of  an incomes  policy- 
based stabilization to show that the overvaluation  could have been pre- 
dicted. 
Equilibrium Hypothesis 
The first model focuses  on the interaction of capital, goods,  and labor 
during the process of trade liberalization, domestic fiscal tightening, and 
improving the access  to external capital. Specifically,  we are interested 
in the predictions  of the equilibrium model regarding resource  alloca- 
tion, asset  prices,  and the real exchange  rate. We review  the Mexican 
reforms, one at a time, in terms of this model. 
We assume  that capital is used to produce tradables. Nontradables, 
or home goods, by contrast, are produced with labor alone. Labor is mo- 
bile across  all sectors.  In the tradables market, firms produce at given 
world prices with capital and labor. Production functions are neoclassi- 
cal. Thus, labor demand in the traded goods sector depends on the given 
capital stock and the wage in terms of dollars. An increase in the product 
wage reduces the demand for labor in the traded goods sector at a given 
capital stock. 
Consider now the home goods  market. To start, assume that all dis- 
posable income from labor is spent and all income from capital is saved 
and invested at home. There is also government spending in the amount 
G, which is initially financed by borrowing abroad. Demand for home 
goods is a function of the relative price of exports and imports in terms of 
home goods.  We assume that expenditure shares are constant.  We also 
assume a given unit labor requirement. For simplicity,  it is set at unity. 
The rate of investment in the economy  depends on the profitability of 
installing capital. Installation of new capital uses  imported machinery 
with an increasing marginal cost. The higher the price of installed capital 268  Br  ookings Paper-s on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
in dollars, the higher is the rate of gross investment.  Net investment  is 
gross investment less the given rate of depreciation: 
(1)  K  =  I(q)-dK, 
where K  is the increase in the capital stock,  K is the capital stock,  I is 
gross investment,  d is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock,  and 
(Tobin's) q is the price of installed capital in dollars. 
Wages in dollars, w, are determined in the labor market that is in equi- 
librium when sectoral labor demands equal the available labor supply. 
Accordingly,  the labor market yields an equilibrium wage as a function 
of the capital stock,  the level  of government  spending, and the income 
tax rate: 
(2)  w  w(K,G,  t), 
where t is the income tax rate. 
Other things equal, equilibrium wages in dollars are higher, the higher 
is the economy's  aggregate capital stock  or the higher is government 
spending. A higher income tax rate reduces the demand for home goods 
and thus, other things equal, reduces wages. 
The model is closed  by specifying either access  to the capital market 
or the financing of investment.  We first consider the case where there is 
no access  to the international capital market. All investment  is financed 
at home out of income from capital. Income from capital increases  with 
the capital stock but declines  as the wage in dollars rises,  because  the 
return to a unit of capital, R(w), is declining in w: 
(3)  qI(q) =  KR(w). 
The model is summarized in figure 9. Along the IS schedule,  the labor 
market clears,  and saving is equal to investment.  The schedule  is nor- 
mally upward sloping to reflect the assumption that a rise in the capital 
stock raises total profits. Along the K  =  0 schedule,  the capital stock is 
constant.  The economy's  steady state is point A, where saving is equal 
to investment and the capital stock is stationary. 
Consider now the effect  of budget consolidation  through higher tax 
rates or lower government  spending. Reduced  labor demand arising in 
the home goods market will lower the equilibrium real wage. For a given 
capital stock,  the fall in dollar wages  raises profits. Thus, the IS curve Ruidiger  Dornblusch and Alejandr-o Werner  269 




Capital  stock, K 
shifts upward to IS' (not shown). There are immediate increases in 
profits,  the real price of capital, and the equilibrilm  rate of investment. 
Over time the economy moves to point B. Capital  will have been accu- 
mulated  and the fall in the real wage will have been offset, at least par- 
tially, by the increased  capital stock. The traded  goods sector expands 
as the shift  toward  a balanced  budget  involves a cut in demand  and a re- 
allocation  of resources  to the traded  goods sector. 
As for the real exchange rate, one must look at the wage in dollars. 
This model  predicts  that  budget  cuts will lead to real  depreciation-a fall 
in the wage in dollars-in  the short run. Later, as capital accumulates 
there  is some real appreciation. 
Consider  next the case where the economy opens up financially.  Spe- 
cifically,  let the country  in the model have access to capital  at the yield 
i* in dollars,  which is the New York  prime  rate  plus a risk  premium.  The 
arbitrage  equation  representing  the capital  market  equilibrium  is 
(4)  cj/q  =  i*  -  R(w)lq. 
Figure  10  shows the initial  equilibrium  at point A. The immediate  effect 
of the financial  reform  (assuming  i* < d) is a boom in asset prices, mov- 270  Brookings Papers  on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
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ing the economy  from point A to B  Then the economy  moves along the 
stable trajectory JJ from point B to C. The high real price of capital im- 
mediately  encourages  a higher rate of capital formation.  Over time, as 
capital accumulates,  real wages  rise or the real exchange  rate appreci- 
ates. The traded goods sector expands by becoming more capital inten- 
sive. The expansion is made possible by the high valuation of capital and 
the resulting capital accumulation. 
The  model  highlights  that greater access  to world  capital  markets 
brings about equilibrium real appreciation.  It also improves welfare for 
workers while rewarding owners  of existing  capital.  Everybody  wins, 
even the government,  since the tax base and hence tax revenues expand. 
The process  of opening up the capital account  or gaining access  to 
world capital markets is reinforced when the political risk premium de- 
clines.  This corresponds to a reduction in the cost of capital,  ii,  and an 
upward shift in the trajectory JJ (not shown).  Stock prices rise and in- 
vestment booms.  Finally, real wages rise and the tax base expands-re- 
sulting in prosperity for all. 
Access  to the capital market also  affects  consumer  behavior.  Spe- Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Alejandr-o  Wer-ner-  271 
cifically, domestic financial repression and credit rationing may decline, 
a process  that could be fostered  by an international financial opening. 
Availability of consumer credit then raises spending, part of which falls 
on home goods.  Wages in dollars rise,  and this effect  tends to reduce 
asset prices (in the tradable goods sector) and reduce capital formation. 
Financial opening is therefore a mixed issue. Its effects on capital forma- 
tion depend on whether there is significant financing for consumers  as 
opposed to firms. I 
Next consider the effects of trade liberalization. Suppose specifically 
that a group of imported consumer  goods,  previously  prohibited,  be- 
comes  available.  We represent  this as a fall in the share of nontraded 
goods  in total spending.  As  the demand for home goods  declines,  the 
equilibrium wage  in dollars falls.  The increased  profitability of capital 
in the traded goods  sector boosts  the stock market. Over time, capital 
accumulates  and  real  wages  recover.  To  maintain full  employment, 
trade liberalization unambiguously requires a real depreciation or a fall 
in the dollar wage. 
Finally, measures that increase efficiency  also affect the equilibrium 
model. An increase in total factor productivity increases  labor demand 
and raises the equilibrium relative wage. Even so, profitability rises and 
the real price of  capital  increases  accordingly.  Capital formation  ex- 
pands, raising real wages. 
Overvaluation Hypothesis 
The overvaluation  hypothesis  views  the real appreciation of the ex- 
change rate as the outcome  of an inflation stabilization  using incomes 
policy and exchange  rate targeting. In Mexico,  such policies  were cen- 
tral to bringing down inflation from its peak of nearly 200 percent (figure 
2). 
Incomes  policy is practiced in a formal and ceremonious  agreement 
called the pacto.  The parties are the government-friendly  unions  with 
their octogenarian  boss  Don  Fidel  Velasquez,  representatives  of  the 
business  community,  and the government.  Labor agrees to limit wage 
inflation; business  agrees to limit price increases;  and the government 
contributes with commitments on public sector prices and the exchange 
rate. The agreements initially ran for 2 months and have been extended 
11. This point is made by Japelli and Pagano (1994). 272  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
Table 8.  Inflation and Depreciation in Mexico,  1987-93 
Percent per year 
Producer  Consumer 
price  pi-ice  GDP  Wage  Exchange 
Year  indexa  indexa  deflator  inflationb  l atec 
1987  145.3  131.8  139.6  128.9  120.4 
1988  99.3  114.2  99.4  109.7  62.9 
1989  12.8  20.0  25.9  30.8  8.5 
1990  22.7  26.7  29.5  30.6  14.3 
1991  19.1  22.7  21.6  28.4  6.2 
1992  12.0  15.5  16.2  26.6  2.6 
1993  6.6  9.8  11.0  16.5d  0.0 
Sources:  Banco  de  Mexico  (1993); Banco  de  Mexico,  Inidicadores Econ6nicos,  various  issues;  and unpublished 
data from the Mexican  Finance  Ministry. 
a.  Year average over previous  year's  average. 
b.  Nominal average earnings in manufacturing. 
c.  Pesos  per dollar. 
d.  Measured from August to August. 
to 6 and 12 months.  They have been followed  by the government  and 
renewed  regularly.  In appendix  A,  we  report the  terms of  the pacto 
agreements of the 1987-93 period. 
At the outset, the pacto contained price controls for a basket of essen- 
tial consumer  goods.  Increasingly,  the use  of formal controls  has re- 
ceded and given way to a broad understanding of the room for price in- 
creases,  specific  wage  targets,  and discussions  of  productivity-based 
wage policies.  The exchange  rate commitment by the government con- 
tinues to be central. Mexico has taken a decidedly corporatist approach 
to prices and the labor market. The government  because  of its perva- 
sive, unrestricted powers can make agreements stick. 
Trade liberalization was another feature of the disinflation strategy. 
Since domestic markets in Mexico were highly oligopolistic  and controls 
might risk shortages, liberalization was used to enforce better price dis- 
cipline and alleviate potential shortages. 
The process of disinflation is shown in table 8. As one can see, during 
1987-93, wholesale  prices fell more rapidly than consumer  prices.  The 
reason is that the budget correction  meant the withdrawal of various 
subsidies that enter the consumer price index (CPI) but not the producer 
price index (PPI). The most  striking point,  though,  is the discrepancy 
between  PPI inflation and exchange  rate depreciation  brought out  in 
figure 11. The government systematically  used underdepreciation or de- Rludiger  Dornblusch and Alejandr-o Werner  273 
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parture from a purchasing power parity exchange rate rule to foster dis- 
inflation. 
Consider what happens in an economy  with considerable inflation in- 
ertia when an exchange rate-based  stabilization is put in place. Starting 
with high inflation, assume the government reduces the rate of currency 
depreciation  to zero.  Although the new  long-run equilibrium has zero 
inflation and the original real exchange  rate, there are disruptive transi- 
tional effects. 
The immediate effect of fixing the exchange rate is to cut the nominal 
interest rate and hence the real interest rate, so that demand increases. 
The inertia in prices plus the fixed nominal exchange  rate generates  an 
appreciation of the real exchange  rate. As the appreciation continues, 
the original increase in demand erodes.  In addition, the real interest rate 
increases,  and, in the early phases of the program, the current account 
moves  into deficit.  The economy  returns to full equilibrium, with re- 
duced inflation, only after deflation has restored the initial level of com- 
petitiveness. 
The model is oversimplified in a number of ways.  First, there are no 
lags in the adjustment of demand and the current account to changes in 274  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
the real exchange rate. Second,  the adjustment to the real exchange rate 
assumes  an immediate substitution effect,  contrary to the Diaz-Alejan- 
dro effect. 12 If during the first stages of the disinflation program the real 
appreciation  is expansionary,  this  will further increase  the overvalu- 
ation of the exchange rate, increasing the recession  necessary  to restore 
the original real exchange  rate. Third, the monetary mechanism  oper- 
ates entirely through interest rates and there is no role for credit and con- 
fidence. Again, given the importance of the credit constraints that firms 
and consumers  face,  the remonetization  of the  economy  that occurs 
when  the  nominal interest  rate drops  increases  the  amount  of  credit 
given by the banking sector.  If liquidity constraints are important, one 
can observe that an increase in the supply of credit does not cause a de- 
cline in the real interest rate. Finally, wealth effects and asset processes 
play no role. 
Even though these aspects  of adjustment are absent, this highly styl- 
ized model captures the pattern of the adjustment process.  It highlights, 
in particular, that, on the way to disinflation,  high unemployment  and 
large deficits make continuing the program increasingly difficult; if con- 
fidence breaks down,  so does the financing of external balances.  In this 
case, interest rates will soar, output will fall, and ultimately the program 
will be abandoned. 
In Mexico,  the exchange rate-based  stabilization was complemented 
by  incomes  policy,  and  the  disinflation  from  triple-digit  levels  was 
achieved  largely  through  containment  of  wage  increases.  A  simple 
model of this process  follows.  Price inflation comprises  wage inflation 
and depreciation:"3 
(5)  p  =  aw  +  (1-a)e, 
where p equals price inflation, w equals wage inflation, e equals nominal 
exchange rate depreciation,  and a equals the proportion of wages in the 
total cost of production.Wage  inflation is based on past inflation and the 
output relative to potential output: 
(6)  w = P_1 + cy, 
12.  Diaz-Alejandro (1965) asserts that the income effect of a devaluation demands the 
substitution effect in the short run. If this is the case, an appreciation will be expansionary 
in the short run. 
13.  For a detailed exposition  of the process,  see Dornbusch (1993a). See Vegh (1992) 
and Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) for references  to the experience  with exchange  rate- 
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where y equals deviations  of output from the natural level and c is a pa- 
rameter that measures  the sensitivity  of wages  to cyclical  conditions. 
Combining equations 5 and 6 yields an inflation rate that shows full per- 
sistence,  so  that inflation today  equals  inflation yesterday,  except  as 
there is unemployment or real appreciation: 
(7)  p  =  p-I  +  acy  +  (l-a)(e-pl)- 
In Mexico,  the pacto  contributed in two ways to the disinflation proc- 
ess. First, the explicit price agreements helped cope with the persistence 
issue:  business,  labor, and the government  agreed to break the back- 
ward-looking indexation pattern. They agreed on limits consistent  with 
an immediate  disinflation.  Second,  the government  helped  in a major 
way by allowing real appreciation of the currency.  Third, slow growth 
dampened any possibility  of labor shortages. 
We complete  the model  by looking  at the determinants  of real de- 
mand. Here,  the level  of the real exchange  rate and real interest rates 
are the prime determinants. Combining these demand determinants with 
inflation in equation 7 and assuming uncovered interest rate parity yield 
an inflation process that emphasizes both the current difference between 
inflation and depreciation and the level of the real exchange  rate. 
But does  this explain what happened in Mexico?  We investigate  to 
what extent  the hypothesis  based on price and wage  setting is able to 
explain the extent of the appreciation that has been observed  during the 
pacto.  For  this,  we  estimate  the  following  equation  for  the  1984:2- 
1993:2 period using quarterly data. The equation comes  from equation 
7, substituting the determinants of y fory and assuming uncovered inter- 
est rate parity: 
(8)  P-P-i  =  c +  d(e-p-1)  +f(e-p_1)D  +  g(E-P)_1, 
where  the  dummy  variable D  takes  the  value  of  one  from  1984:2 to 
1987:4, E equals the nominal exchange  rate (in logs),  and P equals the 
price level  (in logs).  The dummy accounts  for the introduction  of in- 
comes policy, which interrupts the inertia of inflation. The estimated co- 
efficients  with  their  t-statistics  in  parentheses  are  c  equals  -  0.59 
(-  1.56),  d equals  0.66  (7.4), f  equals  -0.38  (-3.03),  and g  equals 
0.00046 (1.92).  14 The estimates highlight the substantial degree of persis- 
tence that is present in the inflation process.  They also capture the im- 
14. The equation also controls for the impact of foreign interest rates and inflation on 
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Figure 12.  Time Path of the Inflation Rate 
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Source:  Authors'  simulations  as described  in the text. 
portant reduction in inertia that was achieved during the exchange rate- 
based stabilization through wage and price agreements. The coefficient 
f is negative and significant. 
Using  the estimated  parameters,  we now  simulate the effect  on the 
inflation rate and the real exchange  rate of fixing the nominal exchange 
rate when quarterly inflation is running at about 50 percent (which was 
the quarterly rate in December  1987). Figures  12 and 13 show the time 
path of the inflation rate and the real exchange  rate. Fixing the nominal 
exchange  rate  accomplishes  a  very  substantial,  rapid  disinflation. 
Within a year, inflation evaporates.  But the implications for the real ex- 
change rate are just  as striking. The large immediate real appreciation 
that is the price of fixing the nominal exchange rate is undone only gradu- 
ally-over  years (figure 13). Both aspects of our model are clearly pres- 
ent in the Mexican experience. 
If the overvaluation hypothesis  is correct, the return to a competitive 
real exchange  rate will be a drawn-out process,  in which  slow  growth 
and high unemployment are the chief vehicles  of change. The alternative 
to a prolonged recession  is a real depreciation-an  issue to which we re- 
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Figure 13.  Time Path of the Real Exchange Rate 
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More  Arguments 
As we have noted, supporters of the equilibrium hypothesis  hold that 
the external imbalance is not a problem. (Appendix B also discusses  the 
equilibrium model in some  detail.) They believe  that it simply reflects 
the forces of reform and restructuring under way. A large deficit means 
that investment is running high and that capital goods are being imported 
to build the export base of tomorrow. 
Their argument must be viewed with a dose of skepticism.  The com- 
position  of imports shows  that capital goods  imports are not a leading 
item. In 1992, capital goods  accounted  for only  19 percent of total im- 
ports, intermediate goods for 69 percent, and consumer goods for close 
to 13 percent.  The fastest  growth item was consumption  goods,  which 
especially  benefited from the trade liberalization.  Table 9 shows  Mex- 
ico's structure of imports. 
Also, while it is true that investment has increased substantially in the 
past few years, as shown in table 10, much of that investment  has been 
in residential and business  structures not in plant and equipment.  The 
overvaluation hypothesis  explains investment  as the result of the sharp 
drop in real interest  rates that accompanies  an exchange  rate-based 278  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Table 9.  Structure of Imports in Mexico,  1986 and 1992 
Percent of total 
Type  of goods  1986  1992 
Consumer  5.0  12.5 
Intermediate  77.3  68.9 
Capital  17.7  18.6 
Source:  Banco de Mexico  (1993, p. 3 11). 
(temporarily credible) program. As a result of lower real interest rates 
and reduced  inflation,  credit  markets  reopen.  The  trade reform  and 
overvaluation  help reduce the cost  of imported durables, and specula- 
tive elements  surrounding a possible  policy reversal reinforce the urge 
to buy. 15 
Another reason to disfavor the equilibrium model is that it has a hard 
time explaining  the falls in output and employment  that are gradually 
emerging. By contrast, the overvaluation model would predict that, be- 
yond the initial expansion phase (the result of greater credit, higher real 
interest rates, and possibly rising real wages), overvaluation  starts slow- 
ing demand and output. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro notes that real deprecia- 
tion first depresses  demand via income  effects  before  stimulating de- 
mand via substitution effects,  which come to dominate. 16 In the case of 
Mexico,  the argument applies in reverse: real appreciation first creates 
demand; then the drag of adverse substitution effects takes over. 
Another way to test the usefulness  of the two theoretical approaches 
is to look at the nominal interest rates on securities of different denomi- 
nations. Why not look at dollar and peso securities  issued by the Mexi- 
can government and recover the expectations  of depreciation implicit in 
the yield differential? If the exchange rate is overvalued,  depreciation is 
a possibility  and the yield differential will reflect the extent  of the mis- 
alignment. 
We therefore look at financial data for evidence  of whether the finan- 
cial markets perceive the real appreciation or the increasing trade deficit 
as an equilibrium phenomenon  (in which case  they would not react to 
changes  in the  trade balance  or the  real exchange  rate because  that 
15.  Guillermo Calvo, in particular, has emphasized the speculative  element.  See, too, 
Dornbusch (1986). 
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Table 10.  Growth and Investment in Mexico,  1989-93 
Percent per year 
Investment 
GDP  (percent 
Year  per capita  of GDP) 
1989  1.3  17.3 
1990  2.4  18.7 
1991  1.6  19.5 
1992  0.7  21.7 
1993  -  1.2  20.7 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on unpublished data from INEGI  and Itntern7ationtal  Fin7an7ciail  Statistics. 
model does not predict such an adjustment). In table 11, we regress the 
interest rate differential (adjusted by the announced  depreciation)  for 
monthly data for the April 1988-June 1993 period on a trend (to account 
for improving program credibility as time passes),  a dummy (to account 
for the announcement of the Brady plan in June 1989), the average matu- 
rity of public debt with one lag measured in days (to account for the fact 
that with a maturity the probability of a speculative  attack diminishes), 17 
and the real exchange  rate or the trade balance  (in billions  of dollars) 
with one lag. We use three interest rate differentials: the difference be- 
tween  the one-month  cete  (denominated  in pesos)  and the one-month 
certificate of deposit (CD) in the United States; the difference between 
the cete and the pagafe,  which is a dollar-indexed instrument issued by 
the Mexican government; and the difference between the pagafe  and the 
U.S.  CD. 
The real exchange  rate is consistently  insignificant in the regressions 
(not shown), but the expected  devaluation measured by the cete-CD dif- 
ferential  depends  positively  on  the  trade  deficit.  An  increase  of  the 
(monthly) trade deficit of $1 billion increases the interest rate differential 
by 2.5 percentage  points.  The reason  why  the cete-pagafe  regression 
turns out poorly may be that, when the expected  devaluation increases, 
the government issues more pagafes  and, given that it faces a downward 
demand for pagafes,  the price goes  down so its yield goes  up. This re- 
gression suggests that the government has been managing the composi- 
tion of its domestic debt in order to respond to cost differentials. 
17. Giavazzi and Pagano (1989). 280  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Table 11.  Explaining Interest Rate Differentialsa 
Average 
matuirity  Twice- 
Brady  of puiblic  Trade  Lagged  lagged 
Dependent  plan  debt  balance  dependent  dependent 
va-iable  Constant  dummy  Trenidb  (lagged)c  (lagged)  variable  variable 
Cete-U.S.  CD  0.012  0.0027  -0.0113  -0.0016  -0.0021  0.64  -0.14 
differential  (4.4)  (1.9)  (-1.9)  (-2.3)  (-1.6)  (4.6)  (-1.8) 
Cete-pagafe  0.005  -0.0003  -0.0035  -0.0006  -0.0009  0.57  ... 
differential  (2.8)  (-3.0)  (-0.6)  (-1.  1)  (-  0.6)  (I 1.0) 
Pagafe-U.S.  CD  0.006  0.0029  -0.0093  -0.0004  -0.0009  1.02  0.56 
differential  (4.8)  (3.5)  (-2.7)  (-1.0)  (-1.2)  (10.0)  (6.0) 
Sources:  Authors'  regressions  based  on  data from  Banco  de  M6xico,  Itidicadores  Econ6nmicos, various  issues; 
and unpublished data from the Finance  Ministry. 
a.  The  dependent  variables  are  the  interest  rate differential  between  the  cete  (a one-month  peso-denominated 
government bond) and a one-month  U.S.  certificate of deposit  (CD); a one-month cete  and a pagafe  (a dollar-indexed 
instrument issued  by the Mexican  government);  and a pagafe  and a one-month  U.S.  CD.  Regressions  use  monthly 
data from April 1988 to June  1993. Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  Coefficient  multiplied by  100. 
c.  Measured in days; coefficient  multiplied by  100. 
Lessons of the Mexican Reforms 
We have explored  two hypotheses  of the macroeconomic  develop- 
ments in Mexico.  One asserts that equilibrium prices of assets and dollar 
wages  have risen as a result of various reform measures.  This equilib- 
rium view  acknowledges  no  problems  in the  Mexican  economy  and 
hence  offers no policy  remedies.  According  to this view,  NAFTA  will 
reinforce confidence and help fortify the resolution of lenders. The new 
independent  central  bank  will  institutionalize  financial  stability  and 
strengthen reform with beneficial effects on access  to capital markets. 
The disequilibrium view,  by contrast,  accepts  the extraordinary re- 
form effort and the prospective  benefits of liberalization and NAFTA. 
But it recognizes,  we believe  rightly, that overvaluation  is one  of the 
gravest policy  errors along the way.  Overvaluation  stops growth and, 
more often than not, ends in a speculative  siege on the exchange rate and 
ultimately currency realignment. That sequence  occurred in Europe a 
few years ago and has been repeated numerous times in Latin America. 
Chile, as mentioned earlier, overused the exchange rate in the 1970s and 
its economic  program crashed; in the 1980s, Chile gave inflation control 
an important but not exclusive  role,  and as a result of the macroeco- 
nomic strategy growth in the latter period was highly satisfactory.  In- Riidiger  Dornbulsch  and  Alejandr-o  We}rner  281 
deed,  after a host of exchange  rate-based  stabilizations  the lessons  are 
clear.  18 
-First,  a pegged exchange  rate is immensely  helpful at the outset of 
a stabilization effort. It helps rally expectations,  and incomes policy can 
be organized around it. Moreover,  a fixed rate can be counted on to im- 
mediately improve inflation performance. 
-Second,  almost without exception,  a fixed rate will not imply zero 
inflation. Inflation will fall off, perhaps sharply, but it will not end alto- 
gether. Accordingly,  there is a need to reassess  very quickly when to 
abandon the fixed rate and settle for some inflation, though at a far more 
moderate rate than before the stabilization. 
-Third,  much of the disinflation must happen through the initial in- 
comes  policy  package.  Fixing  only the exchange  rate risks overvalu- 
ation. 
-Fourth,  a crawling peg that offsets the prevailing inflation with cur- 
rency  depreciation  avoids  an accumulation  of  real  appreciation  that 
would ultimately risk the success  of stabilization.  Yet,  as useful as ex- 
change rate pegging is at the outset,  it is equally important to eliminate 
it as soon as possible. 
-Fifth,  incomes  policy  is helpful at the outset,  but private  sector 
competition must soon take over the work of keeping prices down. 
How  does  the  Mexican  experience  compare?  Incomes  policy  was 
helpful initially but then got in the way. The pacto  did help bring down 
200 percent inflation very fast. It helped reduce indexation-explicit  or 
implicit-and  diminish  inflation  persistence,  thus  making  the  initial 
sharp disinflation possible.  But the exchange  rate soon  became  over- 
used and the pacto  process  did not make further strides toward low in- 
flation, except at the expense  of competitiveness.  In August 1991, an ob- 
server called for the pacto  to move  to a permanently fixed rate on the 
dollar: 
Pacto-fatigue  is a fact; it is hard  to believe that  the current  policies can go on for 
another  year or two. It is time to take the government  out of wage-price  setting 
and  bring  the market  in. That  is understood.  The only issue is how to do it and 
18.  See Calvo and Vegh (1992), Dornbusch  and Simonsen  (1987), Dornbusch  (1986, 
1993a, 1993b, and 1994), Dornbusch and Fischer (1993), Edwards (1993a, 1993b), Kiguel 
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when. The answer  here is one more  pacto to safely land  the economy, then de- 
clare  victory  and  get out. When?  The sooner  the better.  19 
In February 1992 (before the European lessons  of that fall) the story 
was still the same: 
...  no problem  in anchoring  the peso to the dollar,  preferably  without  any mar- 
gins so as to gain  the maximum  benefit  of monetary  integration  and  the maximum 
reduction  in Mexican interest  rates. But even as the peso is tied to the dollar, 
inflation  should  be pushed  down  to American  levels rapidly.  There  is no interest 
in allowing  a Spanish-style  cumulative  overvaluation  which  ultimately  is hard  to 
undo and  which  is bound  to slow growth.20 
Because  of the complications  caused by the persistent use of incomes 
policy,  by early 1993 a rollback in the exchange  rate was judged neces- 
sary.21  Of the options for doing so-recession;  maxidevaluation; and in- 
creasing the pace of the crawl-the  last was favored.  Specifically, 
The strategy  of a faster  crawl  would accept an increase  of inflation  to 15-18  per- 
cent as the price  for gaining  competitiveness  and the price  for avoiding  a recur- 
rence of the exchange  rate and social crises of the past election years. The pace 
of the crawl  would be stepped  up immediately  to 22 percent  per year, declining 
toward 17 percent over 18 months....  The art of inflation  fighting  is to know 
when to stop. A wise US senator  when asked for counsel on what to do about 
the unending  Vietnam  War  advised: declare  victory and get out. Mexico's au- 
thorities  should  reassess their  priorities  and  shift  to a model  where  growth  comes 
first,  but  inflation  is firmly  contained  below a 20  percent  barrier.  That  is possible, 
as Chile's  example  of the past decade shows quite  convincingly.22 
To those who accepted that Mexico had a problem, waiting for the elec- 
tion  year  to  end  with  still  greater  overvaluation  was  clearly  a  big 
mistake. 
Learning from unsuccessful  exchange  rate-based  stabilization in the 
1970s, Chilean policymakers  of the 1980s never made inflation the abso- 
lute and exclusive  target; overvaluation never happened and growth was 
strong.23 That lesson  should  have  been  understood  in Mexico  two  or 
three years ago. Regrettably, however,  Mexican policymakers  opted to 
replicate the mistakes of the 1970s Chilean strategy rather than the posi- 
tive lessons  of the 1980s policy. 
19.  Dornbusch (1991, p. 6). 
20.  Dornbusch (1992). 
21.  See Dornbusch (1993a). 
22.  Dornbusch (1993a, p. 379). 
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What Now for Mexico? 
What  are the issues and options now facing Mexico? Since the start 
of 1994,  several speculative  attacks on the peso have occurred;  at least 
$10 billion  in reserves were lost; a swap line with the United States was 
requested  and  granted;  the stock market  declined  more  than  30 percent; 
and short-term  interest rates increased by more than 700 basis points. 
So, while there may not be any deep, fundamental  problem,  there is no 
arguing  with the fact that the market  has doubts about  the economy. 
How Much Action  Is Needed? 
At best, the current  turbulence  merely  reflects  ordinary  election year 
uncertainties,  and the basic economic fundamentals  are sound. In this 
case, the very best strategy,  for the ruling  party  and  the country  alike, is 
to maintain  the exchange rate strategy (the band agreed in the last 
pacto),  pursue high interest rates and borrow  to cover the current  ac- 
count deficit, ride out the crisis and  the elections, and prove the market 
wrong. Once the election is won and the continuity  of policies is estab- 
lished  (presuming  the ruling  party  is reelected),  the economic model and 
the strategy  would  be vindicated.  Financial  instability,  devaluation,  and 
inflation  would be avoided, and credibility  would increase. France in 
1993-94-with  its refusal  to give up on the franc's fixed parity  with the 
deutsche  mark  in the face of massive adverse speculation-provides an 
example  of this sit-tight  approach. 
A closely related interpretation  of Mexico's current  position is that 
the current  level of the exchange rate is probably  wrong and that, for 
growth  reasons, something  needs to be done-but  not in the midst  of an 
election year. Politically, the loss of face inherent in a devaluation  is 
troublesome,  since so much rhetoric  goes into defending  the fixed-rate 
strategy. It is simply easier to allow high interest rates to prevail (as 
France  did  in 1993)  until  a more  convenient  (postelection)  time comes to 
devalue. 
Some others  agree  with the need for action.94  Observers  in this camp 
24.  In Mexico,  this view has been entertained in some form or another during the past 
two or three years and has all the appearances of Akerlof's  (1990) theory of procrastina- 
tion. As Akerlof emphasizes,  postponement of the inevitable by rationalizing the low costs 
of delay is irrational. In this instance,  the accumulated costs  of imbalances in the form of 
hysteresis  effects  of low growth and increased trade penetration make it more important 
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believe  that relying  on  the  capital  market's  interpretation  of the  ex- 
change rate can be risky, however,  since the market may suddenly lose 
faith, and a country that is overextended  in its borrowing may face immi- 
nent financial crisis.  Given this risk, they favor a cautious  policy  that 
starts with competitiveness. 
How valid are these views  suggesting that only minor tinkering may 
be needed  in Mexico?  Much depends  on the size of the overvaluation. 
For example,  a minor overvaluation  of 5 or 10 percent  would be hard 
to identify and may disappear in response  to positive  reform or a more 
favorable  external environment.  But a large overvaluation  will not go 
away on its own accord. Indeed, its costs  will rise steeply: first, growth 
will slow; then, interest rates will be raised to defend the currency; then, 
the combination  of low growth and high real  interest  rates will cause 
firms' balance sheets to deteriorate, and hence those of banks. Then ac- 
tive speculation starts. 
This process  has already begun in Mexico,  suggesting  an overvalu- 
ation that needs addressing. Growth is sluggish, and bad debts are accu- 
mulating.  The  realized  real  interest  rates  on  bank  loans,  which  are 
shown in figure 14, have been averaging close to 15 percent over the past 
five years. The growth in nonperforming assets is therefore no surprise, 
a trend that is reinforced by the downturn in economywide  growth.  In 
the  Mexican  banking  system,  nonperforming  loans  have  already  in- 
creased from 2.0 percent of total loans in 1989 to 7.1 percent in 1993. The 
election  year growth in the macroeconomy  may alleviate  the problem 
for a while,  but ongoing overvaluation  will not go away,  and 1994 is at 
best a reprieve. 
Mexico's  vulnerability to the problems inherent in an overvaluation 
is accentuated by the uncertainty surrounding Mexico's  political future. 
Mexico's  rapid embrace of greater political openness  has shattered the 
ruling party's historical coherence,  so that the old corporatism becomes 
unmanageable.  Moreover,  too  much adjustment has been  left for the 
postelection  government.  The rest of the world understands what the 
changes in Mexican  politics  mean-as  the recent volatility  in Mexican 
financial markets makes clear. 
Unless  the exchange rate is devalued,  either recession  will be needed 
to eliminate the external problem and reduce inflation or expansion  will 
be needed to alleviate the lack of growth. Neither option is realistic.  It 
is politically  difficult to squeeze  inflation through recession,  and fiscal 
stimulus, although more tempting, is not a feasible  long-run solution in Rtudiger  Dornblusch and Alejandro Werner  285 
Figure 14.  Average Real Lending Rate,  1990-93a 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on Banco  de Mexico,  ltidicadores  Econ6niicos,  various  issues. 
a.  The  nominal  interest  rate is  based  on  the CPP,  an average  interest  rate in Mexico  similar to the prime rate, 
plus 5 percent.  The series  are plotted as  12-month moving averages. 
b.  Real interest rate is calculated using the nominal rate described in note a minus the depreciation of the exchange 
rate (pesos  per dollar). 
c.  Real interest rate is calculated  using the nominal rate described  in note a minus consumer  price inflation. 
Mexico.  We believe instead that a significant departure from the present 
exchange rate is needed. 
Exchange  Rate  Str-ategies 
As we have argued throughout this paper, only some of the 40 percent 
real appreciation (measured in relative wholesale  prices) since  1988 can 
be credited to the  sharply improved  economic  conditions  in Mexico. 
The rest is suspect.  In fact, the recent 6 percent realignment inside the 
exchange rate band passed  with little chaos or fear, suggesting there is 
room for greater devaluation, but it must occur soon. There were several 
days following the assassination  of candidate Colosio  during which the 
nation rallied behind the official party and that could have provided the 
cover for a realignment. But it is doubtful how much of this momentum 
remains. 
What then are plausible  exchange  rate strategies  given  the present 
predicament? To answer that question  requires asking two  other sup- 
porting questions.  First, is there further pacto  support for a change in 286  Brookings Pape-s  on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Table 12.  Policy Issues and Options 
Aciute  No acite 
problemn  pr-oblem 
Pacto support  Devalue  Crawl 
No pacto support  Float  Get  support 
the exchange rate policy?25  Second, how acute is the current  problem? 
Table 12  presents  a matrix  of options under  four different  scenarios. 
We first  look at the two cases in which  pacto  support  exists. We be- 
lieve such support  can be mobilized, and with it Mexico could manage 
"one last devaluation."  If overvaluation  is an acute problem  and  pacto 
support  is possible, a 20 percent  devaluation  is the preferred  strategy  in 
our view. Using the trade  equations  shown in appendix  C, a 20 percent 
devaluation  would reduce the trade deficit  to approximately  zero. This 
would stimulate growth and reduce the precarious financial depen- 
dence. 
If overvaluation  is not acute but  pacto  support  exists, a crawling  de- 
preciation  is a good solution. This (inflationary)  strategy  takes time, but 
it does reduce some of the pressure  on the exchange rate and has lower 
political  costs. It is decidedly not an emergency  procedure. 
Even if we are wrong about the potential  pacto  support,  however, a 
realignment  will be essential. If the currency  is not devalued,  growth  will 
not keep pace with the growth  of the labor  force; the divisions in Mexi- 
can society will widen; and national stability will be threatened. But 
what is the best exchange rate strategy  if union support  is lacking?  In 
this case, a devaluation  could  quickly  translate  into  political  agitation  for 
wage increases. Inflation  might  shoot up, and expectations of a second 
devaluation would rise with it. Interest rates would stay high in real 
terms;  external  capital  would be reluctant  to come to or stay in Mexico; 
and  growth  would suffer.  It is easy to recall  experiences  of this kind, but 
that does not make such outcomes inevitable. For example, recent ma- 
jor devaluations  in Finland,  Sweden, Italy, Spain, and the United King- 
dom did not lead to inflation-in fact, it has come down, as have interest 
rates. Devaluation  was a boon to these countries.  If the overvaluation  is 
not critical, the best strategy may be to "get support"  from the unions 
before  proceeding. 
25.  The pacto  negotiations  normally seek exchange  rate and wage targets. However, 
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Without pacto  support and with a pressing overvaluation  problem, 
the answer is to use the current crisis to discard the pacto  process  and 
move  to a floating rate. The peso  would be allowed  (by lower nominal 
interest  rates)  to  fall  about  20 percent.  Monetary  and fiscal  policies 
would face the hard challenge of allowing the real depreciation and pre- 
venting a resurgence of major inflation. There is no assurance  that this 
strategy must  work; but it is the only option if realignment is to be sought 
outside apacto  accord. Doing nothing in the face of an increasingly tenu- 
ous  currency  situation  means  that these  problems  will be faced  at an 
even less convenient  time, with more surprise and less control. 
To conclude,  President Carlos Salinas de Gortari is rightly acknowl- 
edged for the sweeping  reforms in Mexico,  but he left two loose  ends. 
The first was postponing real democracy  in favor of another six years of 
technocratic rule. The other was overvaluing the currency. For Salinas, 
inflation was  the primary issue, just  as it had been in Chile in the late 
1970s. In his own words, 
We must  bring  inflation  down  to a one-digit  level this year. Some say, why don't 
you relax your inflation  goals a bit so we can have better growth  rates? And I 
respond:  There  is no trade-off  between inflation  and  growth.26 
The evidence  of the past few years contradicts his statement.  Disin- 
flation with overvaluation  is a temporary device  that ultimately causes 
great damage. In Mexico,  that sad ending lies ahead unless the currency 
is devalued. 
APPENDIX  A 
The Pacto Agreements,  1987-9327 
December 1987-February 1988 
Tax measures: Elimination of subsidies,  except for agriculture. Elimina- 
tion of the accelerated  depreciation  incentive  and an additional import 
tax.  Adjustment  in public  sector  prices.  Reduction  in programmable 
spending by 1.5 percent of gross domestic  product. Exchange  rate pol- 
icy to support deflation without sacrificing competitiveness. 
26.  Geri Smith, "Salinas Faces  His Toughest Year Yet,"  Business  Week, February 1, 
1993, p. 41. 
27.  Aspe (1993), updated with information from Banco de Mexico and Presidencia de 
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Trade policy:  Reduction of the maximum import tariff from 40 percent 
to 20 percent and the elimination of import permits. Minimum-wage in- 
crease of 35 percent, and monthly review according to anticipated infla- 
tion. Price agreements for basic products. 
March-April 1988 
Constant public sector goods  prices and tariffs. Exchange  rate fixed at 
its level  on February 29,  1988 (2,297 pesos  to the dollar). A 3 percent 
increase in minimum and contractual wages. 
April-May 1988 
Fixed  public  sector  prices  and fees,  controlled  prices,  and minimum 
wages.  Fixed exchange  rate until May 31, 1988. 
June-August  1988 
Fixed public sector prices and fees; wages and controlled prices. 
Fixed exchange rate until August 31, 1988. 
September-December 1988 
Constant prices, fees,  and minimum wages. Exchange rate fixed. Value- 
added tax reduction from 6 percent to 0 percent in unprocessed  foods 
and medicines.  Income tax reduction of 30 percent for people who earn 
up to four times the minimum wage.  Agreement  by business  to lower 
prices by 3 percent. 
January-July  1989 
Public sector prices that are most important in the consumption  basket 
to remain constant. Exchange rate against the dollar to crawl at one peso 
a day. (Equivalent to an annual rate of depreciation of 16 percent.)  Re- 
duction of import tariff dispersion.  Rise in support prices of agricultural 
products to maintain their real level. 
August 1989-March 1990 
Public sector prices constant. The rate of crawl at one peso a day. Firms 
to maintain prices and controlled prices, reviewed on a case-by-case  ba- 
sis. Government commitment to speed up the deregulation process. 
January 1990-December 1990 
Adjustment of minimum wages according to expected  inflation. Crawl- 
ing peg set at 80 centavos  a day. (Equivalent to an annual rate of depreci- 
ation of 11 percent.)  Adjustment of public sector prices to comply with 
revenue goals of the budget. Revision of controlled prices on a case-by- 
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December 1990-December 1991 
Adjustment  of minimum  wages to maintain  purchasing  power. Crawl  of 
the exchange  rate  reduced  to 40 centavos a day. (Equivalent  to an annual 
rate of depreciation  of 5 percent.) Public  sector prices increased  in No- 
vember  1990  and  fixed  throughout  1991. Revision  of controlled  prices on 
a case-by-case  basis. 
December 1991-December 1992 
Adjustment  of minimum  wages to restore purchasing  power. A target 
zone for the exchange rate introduced.  Ceiling  of the band  depreciated 
20 centavos a day. (Equivalent  to an annual  rate of depreciation  of 2.3 
percent.) Floor of the band kept constant. Adjustment  of public sector 
prices. Value-added  tax reduced  from 15  percent  to 10  percent.  Revision 
of controlled  prices on a case-by-case basis. 
December 1992-December 1993 
Wage increases settled within the target rate of inflation.  One-digit  in- 
creases in electricity  for domestic  use and  gasoline. Crawl  for the ceiling 
of the currency  band  increased  to 40 centavos a day. (An annual  rate of 
depreciation  of 4.6 percent.) Floor kept constant. Further  deregulation 
of economic activity announced. 
December 1993-December 1994 
Ceiling  of the currency  band  depreciated  40 centavos a day. Floor kept 
constant. Minimum  wages adjusted  by the target inflation  rate (5 per- 
cent) plus the average  increase  in labor  productivity.  Reduction  in taxes 
paid  by low-income  workers. 
Reduction  in public prices of industrial  inputs. The maximum  income 
tax rate for firms  decreased  from 35 percent to 34 percent. Other  fiscal 
incentives  for investment  introduced. 
APPENDIX  B 
The Model 
HERE  WE SKETCH our basic model.28  In the home goods market,  spend- 
ing is a given share of labor income, PND  =  a WL(1 -  t), where PN  is the 
price  of nontradables,  D is the quantity  demanded  of nontradables,  L is 
28.  The model extends work by Kouri (1979) and Dornbusch (1989). 290  Brookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
the labor supply, and t is the income tax rate. The price of home goods 
is given by the unit labor cost,  bW. We assume  b is equal to unity for 
simplicity. The government spends G on nontraded goods.  Hence labor 
demand originating in the home goods market is LN=  a(l -  t)L  +  G. 
Investment involves the installation of capital subject to an increasing 
marginal cost. Investment involves only importables. Hence the equilib- 
rium rate of investment  is a function of the price of capital in terms of 
imported machinery. Given world prices,  the exchange  rate proxies for 
the domestic price of imported machinery, I =  I(PK/E),  where PK  is the 
price of capital goods and E is the nominal exchange rate. This real price 
of capital is denoted by Tobin's q. Capital formation is given by invest- 
ment less the rate of depreciation,  K  = I(q) -  dK. Note that if the instal- 
lation of capital requires labor, the wage in dollars would become  a de- 
terminant of the rate of investment.  In that case, a higher wage in dollars 
would reduce the rate of investment. 
In the traded goods sector, firms produce with a neoclassical  produc- 
tion function.  Labor demand is a function  of the product wage  or the 
wage in dollars, w = WIE,  and of the capital stock, LT=  f(w)K. 
Labor market equilibrium prevails at a wage in dollars that balances 
the full employment labor supply and the demand for labor from the two 
sectors: 
(B-1)  L = f(w)K  +  a(l  -  t)L +  G, 
which yields the equilibrium wage 
(B-2)  w =  w(K,G,  t). 
The model is closed with an arbitrage equation for the capital market. 
With perfect substitution between  domestic  installed capital and assets 
abroad, returns in dollars adjusted for political risks and including capi- 
tal gains must be equalized: 
(B-3)  R(w)/q +  q/q  =  iP. Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Alejandro  Werner  291 
APPENDIX  C 
Trade Equations 
To  ASSESS  THE  EFFECT  of the real exchange  rate on the trade balance, 
we estimated a demand for imports (disaggregated by type of goods) and 
the supply and demand for nonoil exports.  We also compare our results 
with a previous study for Mexico.  First, we present our estimations  and 
then we provide  a summary of other results.  All variables are in logs, 
and all dollar values are deflated by the U.S.  PPI. 
Import Functions 
We estimated  a different  demand  function  for each class of goods- 
consumption,  intermediate,  and capital-and  then  for the  aggregate. 
The independent  variables used in each case  were real gross domestic 
product and two dummy variables,  POLl  and POL2.  POLl  takes the 
value of one for 1984:1-1985:4 and zero afterward in order to capture the 
substitution  of quotas  for tariffs  that  took place at the end of 1985  (quota 
coverage dropped from 100 percent to 28 percent between June and De- 
cember  of 1985).  The second dummy,  POL2, takes the value of one from 
1984:1 to 1987:4 and accounts for the reduction in tariffs that took place 
at the end of 1987.  (The production-weighted  tariff  went from 22.7 per- 
cent to 11.8 percent between  June and December  of 1987.) To account 
for the fact that there might  be a partial  adjustment  of equilibrium,  we 
also included  the lagged  endogenous  variable  as a regressor.  Other  vari- 
ables included seasonal dummies and the relative price of imports, 
RPi-for  capital and intermediate goods,  the U .S . PPI (multiplied by the 
exchange  rate) divided by the Mexican  PPI; for consumer  goods,  the 
U.S. PPI  (multiplied  by the exchange  rate)  divided  by the Mexican  CPI. 
The estimated  equation  is 
(C-1) IMP(i) =  c +  boGDP +  bIRPi +  b1POL1 +  b3POL2 
+  b4Duml  +  b5Dum2 +  b6Dum3 +  b7IMP(i),1. 
The results (for the 1984:1-1993:2  period) with t-statistics in paren- 
thesis are shown in table C  1. We omit the seasonal dummies. 292  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Table Cl.  Explaining Import Demand,  1984-93a 
Indepenidentt  variable 
Relative  Tariff  Tat  iff  Lagged 
Dependent  price of  substituitioni  reduiction  dependent 
variable  Conistanit  GDP  imtiportsb  dunmmy  diummy  var-iable  R2 
Capital goods  -3.71  1.60  -0.08  -0.05  0.13  0.61  0.96 
(-  1.2)  (2.1)  (-0.4)  (-0.8)  (2.0)  (4.5) 
Intermediate goods  1.11  1.40  -0.39  0.02  0.15  0.35  0.98 
(0.9)  (3.4)  (-3.4)  (1.0)  (3.7)  (3.1) 
Consumption  goods  0.21  0.50  -0.37  -0.03  0.32  0.70  0.98 
(0.3)  (0.7)  (-1.5)  (-0.4)  (3.5)  (8.7) 
Total demand  0.08  1.25  -0.30  0.006  0.15  0.52  0.98 
(0.1)  (2.8)  (-2.7)  (0.2)  (3.8)  (5.3) 
Sources:  Authors'  regressions  based  on  data from  Banco  de  Mexico,  Inidicado,es  Econ6tnicos,  various  issues; 
and Itnternationial  Finiancial Statistics. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is a demand  function  for the class  of goods  specified  in the first column.  Regressions 
use  quarterly data from  1984:1-1993:2.  The  numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  All  variables  are expressed  in 
logs. 
b.  For capital and intermediate goods,  the relative price is the U.S.  producer price index divided by the Mexican 
producer price index; for consumer  goods,  the relative price is the U.S.  PPI divided by the Mexican  consumer  price 
index,  in a common  currency. 
Export Equations 
Since Mexico does not face a perfectly elastic demand for its exports, 
we  estimated  the supply and demand for Mexico's  exports  by instru- 
mental variables in order to assess  how the total return from exports will 
change when the exchange rate changes. The export demand and supply 
equations  were  estimated  for the period  1984:1-1992:4.  We postulate 
that 
(C-2)  Xs =  c +  boGDP +  b1trend +  b2RPs +  b3Xst,, 
Xd  =  d +  aoIMPus +  a,RPd  +  a2X  t,, 
where RPs equals the price of nonoil exports  divided by the Mexican 
CPI, RPd  equals the price of nonoil  exports  divided by the U.S.  PPI, 
and IMPus equals total U.S.  imports. 
We use IMPus  and PPIus as instruments in the supply equation,  and 
GDP and the domestic price level in the demand for exports: 
(C-3) Xs =  -3.6  +  0.66GDP  +  0.025trend  +  1.5RPi +  0.31Xyst 
(-0.9)  (1.2)  (2.7)  (3.1)  (1.7) 
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Table C2.  Comparing Long-Run Price Elasticities for Mexican Imports and Exports 
Vani 
Authors'  Wijnber-gen  's 
Measured  long-run  estimates,  estimates, 
elasticity  Estimated  function  1984-93a  1965487a 
Price elasticity  Total  - 0.62 
of imports  Capital  goods  -0.20  -  1.68 
Intermediate  goods  - 0.60  - 0.64 
Consumption  goods  -  1.23  - 3.35 
Activity elasticity  Total  2.50  ... 
of importsb  Capital  goods  4.10  0.71 
Intermediate  goods  2.15  2.84 
Consumption  goods  1.60  1.31 
Elasticity  of nonoil  Demandc  -  1.57  -  1.07 
exports  Supplyd  2.17  ... 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  based on data described  in table Cl;  and van Wijnbergen (1990). 
a.  Authors'  estimates  are for quarterly data; van Wijnbergen's are for yearly data. 
b.  GDP is used  as a measure  of economic  activity  for the authors' calculations.  Van Wijnbergen uses  investment 
as a measure of activity for capital goods,  total consumption goods for consumption goods,  and output for intermediate 
goods. 
c.  U.S.  demand function for Mexican  imports. 
d.  Supply of Mexican  exports. 
Xd=  -20.0  +  1.3IMPus  +  0.66RPd  +  0.58X,l 
(-5.0)  (5.2)  (4.4)  (5.5) 
R2  =  0.89 
With these  results,  we calculate  the long-run elasticity  of imports and 
the demand and supply of nonoil exports.  Table C2 summarizes our re- 
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APPENDIX  D 
Indicators of the Mexican Economy 
THE  FOLLOWING  TABLES provide detailed information on Mexican eco- 
nomic performance between  1980 and 1994. Table D1 presents measures 
of the terms of trade, exchange  rate, and wages.  Table D2 gives public 
finance indicators. Tables D3 and D4 provide general data on gross do- 
mestic product, employment,  and the external sector.  Table D5 shows 
financial and exchange rate data and inflation figures. 
Table Dl.  Real Exchange Rate, Terms of Trade, and Real Wages in Mexico, 
1980-93 
Index,  1980 = 100 
Real 
wages, 
Real  maquila- 
Real  Real  Real  Terms of  wages,  dora 
exchange  exchange  exchange  Terms of  trade  Minimum  manufac-  opera- 
Year  ratea,b  ratea,c  ratea,d  trade  adjustede  wage  tures  tions 
1980  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
1981  118.72  124.43  106.71  97.47  112.41  101.40  104.68  100.91 
1982  86.80  91.87  75.84  84.98  76.33  110.91  103.21  110.65 
1983  79.73  52.23  67.98  77.63  61.52  79.30  79.48  87.29 
1984  97.20  54.47  81.08  76.13  62.77  75.07  74.72  85.88 
1985  100.94  54.42  83.56  72.02  64.18  73.34  76.66  85.55 
1986  69.15  35.66  67.68  51.86  46.90  79.76  65.74  83.52 
1987  63.64  33.33  67.17  57.31  59.40  89.95  66.00  85.03 
1988  77.44  41.32  82.39  51.78  53.63  51.92  64.65  81.21 
1989  84.09  47.79  84.24  54.47  57.18  54.52  70.41  86.98 
1990  84.22  50.10  87.68  55.57  60.99  50.81  72.92  87.55 
1991  92.61  54.52  98.34  51.94  57.71  46.40  77.23  86.24 
1992  98.90  59.09  108.14  51.62  56.74  40.17  83.34  87.49 
1993  102.80  59.79  114.82  49.40  55.10  39.56  81.89  83.87 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  based on real exchange  rate and terms of trade data from Banco  de Mexico  (1993) 
and from International  Financial  Statistics;  wage,  exchange  rate,  and terms of trade data from Salinas  de Gortari 
(1993); and the  relative  price  measure  of  the  real exchange  rate from  Morgan Guaranty Trust  Company  (various 
issues). 
a.  An increase  in the real exchange  rate index indicates  appreciation. 
b.  The real effective  exchange  rate estimated  on the basis of consumer  prices for 133 countries. 
c.  The  real  effective  exchange  rate  estimated  on  the  basis  of  unit labor  costs  for  Mexico's  six  largest  trading 
partners: United  States,  Germany,  Japan,  Canada,  United  Kingdom,  and France.  These  countries  account  for 85 
percent of Mexico's  trade in manufactures. 
d.  The Mexico-U.S.  wholesale  relative  price levels. 
e.  Takes  into account  the effect  of international interest rates on the cost  of debt service. Ruidiger  Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner  295 
Table D2.  Public Finance Indicators for Mexico,  1980-93 
Percent  of GDP 
Puiblic 
Puiblic sector  sector 
borrowing (-)  Pritnary  Operationial  total  Oil  Domestic  Foreign 
Year  r-equir-emnents  balanicea  balanceb  revenues  revenuiesc  debtd  debt 
1980  -7.5  -3.0  -3.6  25.5  7.8  9.9  15.5 
1981  - 14.1  -8.0  - 10.0  25.2  7.7  12.2  16.5 
1982  - 16.9  -7.3  - 5.5  27.8  11.1  15.5  35.8 
1983  -8.6  4.2  0.4  31.7  16.1  16.5  43.7 
1984  -8.5  4.8  -0.3  31.3  15.1  18.8  38.3 
1985  -9.6  3.4  -0.8  30.4  13.3  16.8  40.0 
1986  - 16.0  1.6  -2.4  29.4  11.3  18.3  60.2 
1987  - 16.0  4.7  1.8  29.5  12.0  19.5  54.3 
1988  - 13.0  8.0  - 3.6  29.1  10.1  19.0  43.9 
1989  -5.6  7.9  - 1.7  27.7  9.0  17.6  39.0 
1990  - 3.9  7.8  2.2  27.5  8.8  16.9  30.1 
1991  2.0  9.1  6.4  25.8  2.9  15.6  20.6 
1-.5)e  (5.3)e  (3.3)e  . ..  . ..  ..  .  .. 
1992  3.5  8.8  5.9  26.0  2.5  10.1  16.4 
(0.5)e  (5.6)e  (3.6)e  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
1993  1.0  4.0  1.9  25.4  2.5  7.6f  14.3f 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on Presidencia  de la Republica  (1994)  and Banco  de Mexico  (1993). 
a. Public  sector borrowing  requirements  plus interest  payments. 
b. Adjusts  public  sector  borrowing  requirements  by the inflationary  component  of interest  payments  on domestic 
debt. 
c.  Methodology  for calculations  was changed  in 1991,  so figures  prior  to 1991  are not comparable  with  those after 
1991. 
d. Debt figures  are the public  sector consolidated  with Banco  de Mexico. 
e.  Numbers  exclude  revenues  from  privatization. 
f.  Estimates. 
Table D3.  Gross Domestic Product and Employment in Mexico,  1980-93 
Index,  1980 = 100 
Employment  Emnploymnent,  Social 
Real  Real GDP  inanufac-  maquiladora  security 
Year-  GDP  per- capita  turing  operations  enirollment  Popuilation 
1980  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
1981  107.95  105.39  105.47  109.56  112.76  102.43 
1982  107.35  102.41  103.05  106.28  112.16  104.82 
1983  102.85  95.95  93.37  126.20  114.89  107.19 
1984  106.56  97.28  92.45  167.04  124.43  109.55 
1985  109.32  97.71  94.40  177.31  129.69  111.89 
1986  105.22  92.11  92.50  208.98  133.26  114.23 
1987  107.17  91.94  92.67  255.34  142.37  116.57 
1988  108.51  91.24  92.43  309.08  150.31  118.92 
1989  112.14  92.46  94.59  350.10  160.49  121.29 
1990  117.12  94.71  94.72  374.42  172.28  123.67 
1991  121.37  96.25  93.12  390.94  180.74  126.10 
1992  124.59  96.93  89.48  422.48  179.19  128.54 
1993  125.10  95.50  85.03  447.87  179.37  131.00 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  based  on Salinas  de Gortari  (1993)  and  Itnternlational  Finianicial  Statistics. 296  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Table D4.  External Sectora 
Billions of dollars 
Initer  me- 
Consuimp-  diate  Capital  Initertna- 
Total  Nonoil  Total  tion  goods  goods  Tr-ade  Cuirrent  tionial 
Year  expor  ts  exports  impor  ts  impor-ts  impor  tsb  imnpor  ts  balance  account  reservesc 
1980  18.03  7.59  21.09  2.45  13.47  5.17  -3.06  -  10.72  4.00 
(1.74) 
1981  23.31  8.73  27.18  2.81  16.80  7.57  -3.88  -  16.56  5.04 
(2.23) 
1982  24.06  7.58  17.01  1.52  10.99  4.50  7.05  -  6.27  1.83 
(1.97) 
1983  25.95  9.94  11.85  0.61  9.04  2.20  14.10  5.43  4.92 
(2.82) 
1984  29.10  12.50  15.92  0.85  12.50  2.57  13.18  3.77  8.11 
(3.75) 
1985  26.76  11.99  18.36  1.08  14.11  3.17  8.40  0.41  5.75 
(3.83) 
1986  21.80  15.50  16.78  0.85  12.98  2.95  5.02  -  1.77  6.73 
(4.35) 
1987  27.60  18.97  18.81  0.77  15.41  2.63  8.79  3.82  13.79 
(5.51) 
1988  30.69  23.98  28.08  1.92  22.13  4.03  2.61  -  2.92  6.66 
(7.81) 
1989  35.17  27.30  34.77  3.50  26.50  4.77  0.41  -6.09  6.87 
(9.33) 
1990  40.71  30.61  41.59  5.10  29.71  6.79  -0.88  -7.11  10.30 
(10.32) 
1991  42.69  34.52  49.97  5.83  35.54  8.59  -7.28  -  13.79  18.13 
(11.78) 
1992  46.20  37.89  62.13  7.74  42.83  11.56  -  15.93  -22.81  19.26 
(13.93) 
1993  51.88  44.46  65.36  7.84  46.46  11.05  -  13.48  -23.39  23.28 
(15.13) 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from  Salinas  de Gortari  (1993)  and  unpublished  data  from  INEGI. 
a. Data  for exports  and imports  include  information  from  maquiladora  operations. 
b. Intermediate  imports  from  maquiladoras  are in parentheses. 
c.  International  reserves  are calculated  using  end-of-period  controlled  exchange  rates  for 1982-91  and  the end-of- 
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Table D5.  Interest Rates, Inflation, and Devaluation in Mexico,  1980-93 
Percent  per year, except  as noted 
Market 
exchange 
Consumer  r  ate 
Cete  Pagafe  Stock  price  (pesos  per 
Year  ratea  rateb  maiketc  indexd  dollar) 
1980  22.46  ...  6.72  29.8  0.00 
1981  30.77  .  .  .  -  34.27  28.7  12.78 
1982  45.31  ...  -28.72  98.8  466.17 
1983  56.59  ...  265.67  80.8  8.65 
1984  48.59  .  .  .  64.49  59.2  30.13 
1985  60.18  .  .  .  177.67  63.7  113.13 
1986  86.74  8.80  320.91  105.7  104.47 
1987  95.97  14.50  124.35  159.2  143.44 
1988  69.15  29.80  100.18  51.7  3.14 
1989  44.99  20.80  98.05  19.7  16.68 
1990  34.76  14.50  50.09  29.9  9.79 
1991  19.28  10.90  124.67  18.8  4.34 
1992  15.62  6.20  24.45  11.9  1.44 
1993  14.90  4.08  48.03  8.0  0.00 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on Banco de Mexico  (1993) and Banco de Mexico.  Inidicadores Econ6miicos, 
various  issues. 
a.  A  peso-denominated  government  bond  with  maturity of  three  months  for  1980-81  and one  month  for  other 
years. 
b.  A dollar-indexed  government  bond with maturity of six months for  1986-87 and one  month for other years.  In 
1991, the dual exchange  rate system  disappeared,  so  the pagafe  was replaced  by the tesobanio, which is indexed  to 
the floating rate. Tesobatios  are used starting in  1990. 
c.  Based  on an index for the total Mexican  stock  market. 
d.  December  over  December  change. Comments 
and Discussion 
Guillermo Calvo:  Mexico  is an outstanding example of the tribulations 
involved  in "getting your house  in order" when  initial conditions  are 
bad. This session  is proof of that. After an extended  period of remark- 
able adjustment, accompanied  by firm and clear-minded policymaking, 
we  are still debating the possibility  that Mexico  has taken the wrong 
track and is derailing into low growth and eventual collapse. 
The Dornbusch-Werner paper gives a brief and clear overview  of key 
developments  in  the  Mexican  experiment,  discusses  two  opposing 
hypotheses  in terms of simple models,  and ends with a bang. According 
to the authors, Mexico  should devalue 20 percent "for the last time." In 
my comments,  I will briefly discuss the two opposing views and then ar- 
gue that Mexico's  macroeconomic  problem may be much more serious 
than suggested by the paper but that, happily, the solution may be ready 
at hand (and policymakers  seem to be aware of that). 
I agree with the authors that the "all's well" official view is not fully 
convincing.  True, one must destroy to create, but it is taking a long time 
for growth to materialize,  unemployment  is rising, and savings are dis- 
turbingly low.  Also,  loan interest rates are dangerously high, and there 
seems  to be a bulging share of "bad loans." To explain these facts,  the 
authors lean toward an interpretation in which backward indexation and 
credit segmentation,  of one sort or another, play a key role. Backward 
indexation contributes  in a straightforward way to real appreciation as 
the rate of crawl slows down. On the other hand, a lower rate of devalua- 
tion-if  it enjoys  some  credibility-lowers  domestic  nominal interest 
rates and may stimulate credit, even in cases in which the attendant real 
interest rate rises. 
To see the last point, consider  the realistic case  in which borrowers 
pay back their debts in the form of a constant  stream of nominal install- 
298 Rludiger  Dornbusch and Alejandr-o Wer-ner  299 
ments. Let the rate of devaluation  be denoted by e; thus, abstracting 
from  credibility  and  country-risk  problems  and  assuming  a zero interna- 
tional interest rate,  the  domestic  nominal interest rate will  also 
equal  E.  Now assume, for simplicity, that loans are given in perpetuity 
and that the rate of devaluation  is expected to be constant. Hence, an 
individual  who borrows  a sum Y  will have to pay an installment  equal  to 
E  Y in perpetuity. Furthermore,  normalizing  the present price level to 
unity and assuming  zero international  inflation  and a constant real ex- 
change  rate, one finds  that domestic inflation  will also be equal  to E and 
that the stream  of real payments by the borrower  will be given by the 
following  expression: 
E  Ye-et,  t -  0, 
where t = 0 is the time the loan is granted.  Consequently,  the higher  is 
the rate of devaluation,  E, the higher  is the real value of the first  few in- 
stallments.  When inflation  is high, the real value of the first  few install- 
ments could be exorbitantly  large, thus deterring  credit. Therefore, a 
substantially  lower rate of devaluation  will make credit affordable  to a 
significantly  larger  segment of the population-most  likely consumers. 
The ensuing  consumption  boom will put upward  pressure  on retailing- 
a highly  labor-intensive  activity-contributing to further  real apprecia- 
tion of the currency. 
It is worth noting that while real appreciation  stemming  from back- 
ward indexation is likely to be undesirable, the one stemming from 
credit segmentation  (or desegmentation)  may not be. Thus, this simple 
model gives some support  to the authors'  opinion that some of the real 
appreciation  is warranted  by sharply  improved  conditions  in the Mexi- 
can economy. Furthermore,  to the extent that  backward  indexation  fol- 
lows a mechanical  formula,  as in the paper, a once-and-for-all  devalua- 
tion may cure excessive real  appreciation. 
The above model has some problems.  In the first  place, backward  in- 
dexation  makes  home  goods excessively expensive and, thus, consump- 
tion must be presumed  to be lower than at full equilibrium.  This would 
imply  that  Mexico is not saving  too little, as the authors  believe, but too 
much!  Therefore,  if the model will have a chance to support  the view 
that  saving  is small,  one needs to identify  other  distortions  that  lead indi- 
viduals  to overspend. 
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guez model in which expenditure  is a decreasing  function  of the real in- 
terest rate. A lower rate of devaluation  reduces the domestic nominal 
interest  rate but, because of backward  indexation, has a smaller  effect 
on the rate  of inflation.  Hence, the real  interest  rate  falls and  expenditure 
rises. Since the fall in the real interest rate reflects a distortion  (that is, 
backward  indexation),  chances are that the resulting  expenditure  boom 
is undesirable,  and Mexico is saving  too little.  I 
In my opinion,  the paper  leaves out a major  factor  in the Mexican  ex- 
periment,  namely, credibility.  Credibility,  and its corollary,  speculative 
behavior,  is mentioned  in the paper  but is not given a big role. However, 
the evidence is clear. Interest rate differentials  with the United States 
have persisted all through  the program.  They have quickly reacted to 
good and bad news. For example, interest  rate differentials  fell sharply 
after  Mexico signed an agreement  with creditor  banks in 1989  and rose 
during  the NAFTA-Perot  impasse and after  the recent tragic  assassina- 
tion.2  Interestingly,  the paper shows a positive association between in- 
terest rate differentials  and the trade deficit. This suggests that con- 
sumption  is an increasing  function  of the differentials  (not the other  way 
around,  as implied  by how the test is conducted  in the paper).  Actually, 
there  is some literature  that  could support  such an association  when sta- 
bilization-liberalization  programs  are not fully credible.3 
To illustrate,  consider  a trade  liberalization  program  that individuals 
think may be abandoned  in the future. An example of such a program 
would  be a unilateral  trade  liberalization  (as in Mexico before NAFTA) 
in which  future  continuation  is seen to depend  on the signing  of an inter- 
national  trade  agreement  or the reelection  of the present  political  party. 
Since future tariffs could rise, individuals  would tend to buy more im- 
ports now than  they would  if full credibility  were the rule. This intertem- 
poral  substitution-which in practice  shows up most notably  in durable 
1.  In a representative-individual  model, backward indexation is not enough to gener- 
ate a consumption boom in response to a lower rate of devaluation.  Calvo and Vegh (1994) 
show that, for the boom to take place, the elasticity  of substitution between  tradables and 
nontradables should be smaller than the intertemporal rate of substitution. The latter con- 
dition,  however,  is  rejected for a group of developing  countries  in Ostry and Reinhart 
(1992). Thus, unlike the present paper, such a model would imply that the response  to a 
lower rate of devaluation is lower consumption. 
2.  Rojas-Suarez (1992). 
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goods-may  be socially costly because it is based on an intertemporal 
distortion  (imperfect  credibility).  Thus, imperfect  credibility  could give 
rise to a socially costly consumption  boom. Furthermore,  if the aban- 
donment of reform  is expected to be accompanied  by a resurgence  of 
inflation,  or any  other  form  of debt  repudiation,  interest  rate  differentials 
may simultaneously  rise.4 
In addition,  this interpretation  helps to rationalize  the boom-bust  na- 
ture of many  stabilization  programs,  which may be emerging  in Mexico 
(although  one should  not discount  the effect of the U.S. recession).5 This 
is so, because in order  to stay within  their  budget  constraint,  individuals 
are forced to slow down consumption  in the future. Thus, future real 
wages will tend to fall, and real exchange rates will tend to rise. In this 
context, a modicum  of downward  price-wage  inflexibility  will result in 
higher unemployment and excess  capacity.6 Furthermore,  the bust 
takes place whether  or not reform  is carried  out. It occurs because the 
ensuing expenditure  contraction  is a consequence of the initial expan- 
sion, which takes place before it is known if reforms  will be carried  to 
full fruition. 
Imperfect  credibility  completely  changes  the set of effective policies. 
A devaluation  Ci la Dornbusch  and Werner,  for example, may sow the 
seeds of destruction.  It may  resolve the overappreciation  problem  in the 
short run, only to give way to a more pronounced  appreciation  and in- 
flation  in the future.  Authorities  would have r evealed their  taste for dis- 
cretionary  policy, and people may come to believe that it could happen 
again.  Therefore,  the same mechanisms  that provoked  the present mis- 
alignment  will be set in motion  again-and with a vengeance. 
The Dornbusch-Werner  proposal  is doubly  dangerous  because policy 
credibility  has not been fully established  in Mexico. True, the signing  of 
NAFTA was a big step forward, but recent developments have in- 
creased  uncertainty  about  government  response. In addition,  an insidi- 
ous "black  hole"  has been developing  over the past several  years, which 
has not yet been subject  to serious  discussion or analysis. I am referring 
4.  See Calvo and Vegh (1993) for an example of a consumption  boom that takes place 
as a result of expectations  that inflation will increase in the future, even though there is no 
expected  change in commercial policy. 
5.  Kiguel and Liviatan (1992). 
6.  This feature holds even in models where individuals are rational but are subject to a 
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to  the  fragility of  the  present  monetary  and exchange  rate policy  in 
Mexico. 
Let the numbers speak for themselves.  Mexico's  ratio of short-term 
highly liquid government  cum banks' liabilities to net international re- 
serves is the highest in Latin America, by a wide margin. In 1993, cetes 
held by the public represented  close  to 100 percent of net international 
reserves.  Moreover,  M2 (not including cetes) was more than four times 
net international  reserves;  for Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  and Uru- 
guay, this ratio hovered  around two or three. Finally,  a more compre- 
hensive  measure of short-term government cum banks' obligations like 
M3 (which includes cetes) was six times larger than net international re- 
serves. 
Much of M3 could quickly turn around and head for Miami. Even if 
one subtracts MI from M3, the result exceeds  four times net reserves, 
and those funds could be back in Miami in less than two months' time. 
If that were to happen, and the authorities were prepared to see reserves 
go to zero, the dollar value of the Mexican  currency would have to fall 
to one-fourth its present value, which would require a devaluation of 300 
percent. This figure would be higher if authorities do not allow net inter- 
national reserves to be fully depleted. 
Fortunately,  the run to Miami need not take place.  One way to pre- 
vent it would be for the U.S.  Treasury to stand ready to buy all the cetes 
in private hands and bail out the Mexican  banking system  in case  of a 
run. This will prevent the run from happening, at practically no cost to 
the U.S.  Treasury. This is so because under these circumstances  the run 
would  not require a devaluation  or a change  in policy.  Hence,  there 
would be no advantage to shipping funds to Miami and, thus,  the run 
would simply not take place-and  the U.S.  funds would never be used.7 
Therefore,  as promised at the outset,  the solution is ready at hand and, 
if carefully orchestrated,  the arrangement would be essentially  costless 
and definitely improve welfare. 
Recent  events  have  shown  that the  U.S.  Treasury  is  prepared to 
make bold moves  in that direction,  which is highly welcome.  Thus far, 
however,  the Treasury's determination has been tested only in connec- 
tion with political  developments,  like the NAFTA-Perot  impasse  and 
7.  This was the rationale behind the stabilization fund set up in connection  with Po- 
land's stabilization program in 1990. It seems to have been successful. Rudiger Dornbulsch and Alejandr-o We}rner  303 
the recent tragic events  in Mexico.  The market still has to be persuaded 
that the Treasury will be prepared to act in a similar fashion if there is a 
garden-variety run against the Mexican currency provoked  by, for ex- 
ample, an unheroic increase in U.S.  interest rates.8 
In my opinion, this is not the time to implement a Dornbusch-Werner 
devaluation.  The  forces  that  have  held  together  the  "good" equilib- 
rium-in  which Mexico  is given credit for its enormous transformation 
effort and clear-minded policymaking-may  dissipate  overnight.  A 20 
percent devaluation  (outside the present band) may get U.S.  investors 
up in arms about the fall in the real value of their cetes,  making it espe- 
cially difficult for any branch of the U.S.  government to rescue Mexico 
if a run against the Mexican peso were set into motion. The Dornbusch- 
Werner solution-taken  without prior consultation and support from its 
NAFTA partners-may  thus prove to be a poison pill for the ruling polit- 
ical party or its successor. 
In my view,  it is imperative that Mexico  obtain ample support from 
the U.S.  Treasury (the numbers recently  seen  in the press look rather 
small), making it perfectly clear that the support would be automatic and 
given in response  to any  run against the Mexican  peso,  not just  those 
triggered by political events.  Obviously,  such a commitment by the U. S. 
Treasury may require a major commitment by the Mexican government 
to the continuation and deepening of the current reform program. 
Stanley Fischer:  This is the best type of paper on which to comment: it 
is serious; it addresses  an important topic; it is well argued and persua- 
sive, but still leaves  something to discuss.  Dornbusch and Werner's ar- 
gument is unmistakably  clear: the Mexican  peso  is overvalued  by at 
least 20 percent and growth will not return unless there is a real devalua- 
tion. The devaluation can be brought about either through a formal de- 
valuation within the pacto  or by floating if the pacto  partners do not 
agree  to  a formal  devaluation.  Given  their  pessimism  that  a formal 
agreement is possible,  Dornbusch  and Werner recommend  a float and 
the abandonment of the pacto. 
I will divide my comments  into three parts. First, I take up the ques- 
8.  Recent press releases  suggest that Mexico  has received  support from its NAFTA 
partners in the form of automatic credit lines,  indicating that policymakers  have a clear 
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tion of whether the peso  is significantly overvalued.  I do that by trying 
to make the opposite  case-that  it is not overvalued-but  conclude  in 
favor of Dornbusch and Werner. Next,  I ask what should be done about 
the problem. Here, I believe the Mexican government should seek a de- 
valuation  within  the pacto,  but that if it cannot  get  an agreement  it 
should accelerate the crawl while seeking to stay in the pacto.  However, 
if the market forces  the Mexican government to devalue,  it should cer- 
tainly  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity.  Finally,  I briefly reinforce 
Dornbusch and Werner's discussion  of the benefits and dangers of using 
the exchange rate as the nominal anchor of a stabilization program. 
Is the Peso  Overvalued? 
The argument for overvaluation  is threefold:  (a) the real exchange 
rate is lower than it has ever been; (b) there is a massive current account 
deficit; and (c) growth has come to a halt. 
The real exchange  rate is very low by historical standards. Relative 
to  1985, which  was  about  average  for the  1970-85  period,  producer 
prices in Mexico  have risen by 37 percent compared with those  in the 
United States. The use of the PPI may bias the argument, but Dornbusch 
and Werner show  that other indexes  give  a similar message.  And be- 
sides,  concentrating on alternative indexes  only proves  the first law of 
overvaluation:  "You know that a country  is overvalued  when  the Fi- 
nance Minister finds one real exchange  rate index according to which 
the currency is not overvalued." 
The real question is what sort of appreciation should be expected  for 
a stabilizing and reforming country  like Mexico.  The Chilean real ex- 
change rate illustrates Dornbusch  and Werner's fears and hopes.  The 
fears are those of the period up to 1982: during the 1970s the Chilean real 
exchange  rate  became  progressively  overvalued  as  the  nominal  ex- 
change rate was used to anchor the stabilization; eventually,  in 1982, be- 
fore the debt crisis, Chile was forced to devalue. The hopes are those of 
the period after 1982: Chile pursued a cheap and cheapening peso policy 
that provided the main incentive  for the exports that drove the Chilean 
expansion. 
But other countries have seen massive  real appreciations during sta- 
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ences. In each case, there  was a large  real  appreciation:  in Spain,  domes- 
tic prices rose by one-third  relative  to foreign  prices during  the reforms 
of the 1970s,  and  then rose by another  one-third  from  the early 1980s  to 
1990 (with the currency  becoming overvalued). In Israel, the real ex- 
change  rate  has appreciated  by close to 30 percent  since the 1985  stabili- 
zation,  but  there  is no question  that  the current  account  deficit  is sustain- 
able. Growth has returned, albeit after a two-year recession during 
which the central  bank had to persuade industry  and the trade unions 
that  it would not accommodate  inflationary  wage increases. 
These examples show that the behavior  of the real exchange rate (or 
relative  prices)  cannot  by itself establish  whether  a currency  is overval- 
ued. The crucial  question is not the level of the real exchange rate, but 
the sustainability  of the current  account, or more directly, of the ex- 
change  parity.  Here is where Dornbusch  and Werner  are on the strong- 
est ground.  Between 1985  and 1992,  the Mexican  current  account  moved 
from balance to a deficit of 7 percent of GNP. This is massive by any 
measure. 
A current  account  deficit  of that size is not sustainable  unless growth 
picks up remarkably.  But perhaps  the deficit  is only temporary.  That is 
the main  argument  of those who believe, or profess to believe, that the 
peso is not overvalued.  The argument  is that with NAFTA coming into 
effect, Mexican  exports will take off, that many  of the imports  are capi- 
tal goods that will soon pay off in increased exports, and that most of 
the remaining  imports  are intermediate  goods, some of them imported 
as part  of an inventory  build-up.  Thus the deficit  will soon decline, both 
because imports of intermediates  will fall and because exports will 
boom. 
Dornbusch  and Werner  do not sufficiently  emphasize  the remarkable 
Mexican  export  boom  of recent years. Between 1985  and 1992,  Mexican 
nonoil  exports  increased  from  $12  billion  to $38  billion,  an extraordinary 
performance  that should  add confidence  to predictions  of continued  ex- 
port improvement.  On the import  side, the authors  emphasize the dra- 
matic proportional increase in  consumption goods  imports, from 
$1 billion  in 1985  to nearly $8 billion in 1992. While the percentage  in- 
crease is dramatic,  the dollar  value of the increase in capital  goods im- 
ports  was larger,  and  imports  of intermediate  goods increased  by $29  bil- 
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needs to focus on imports  of capital  goods and, especially, intermediate 
goods. And here the argument  that capital  goods imports  will pay off in 
improved  growth  and  export performance,  and that intermediate  goods 
imports  may decline, has not been resolved by the authors. 
Still, the Mexican current  account deficit is huge, and it is being fi- 
nanced largely by portfolio investment. Those investments can turn 
around  very quickly and leave Mexico with no choice but to devalue. 
Of course, an increase in Mexican interest rates can stabilize investor 
queasiness  to some extent, but  higher  interest  rates  will set growth  back 
further.  And  as the European  and  especially Swedish  experiences  show. 
There may be no interest rate high enough to prevent an outflow and a 
forced devaluation. 
With  Mexico already  heading  for recession, why go through  the pain 
of raising  interest rates? To answer that question one needs to look at 
the state of the macroeconomy.  The paper  does not pay much  attention 
to the remarkable  decline in Mexican inflation  in the past few years. 
Consumer  price inflation  has come down to the single digits  after  reach- 
ing 30 percent  in 1990.  That is a real achievement,  which helps account 
for the current  economic slowdown. It is not an achievement  that  should 
be given up lightly.  And a maxidevaluation,  carried  out without  the sup- 
port  of labor,  would likely lead to wage pressures  and higher  inflation  in 
Mexico. Of course, the Italian and British devaluations of 1992 give 
hope to every devaluer  that the sleeping  dogs of inflation  will remain  si- 
lent, but  that  is less likely  in a country  that  has based  its entire  macroeco- 
nomic policy on a deal with labor  that includes explicit understandings 
about  the stability  of the exchange rate. 
The effect of a devaluation  on inflation  depends also on the state of 
excess demand  in the economy. But the data do not make the life of a 
Mexico-watcher  easy; statistics come out very late, perhaps  intention- 
ally so. The current  account data are almost a year behind, and GDP 
data are slow to be published. It is hard  to know what to make of the 
data on formal  sector employment,  which show industrial  employment 
declining since 1990 even as aggregate  industrial  output continued to 
climb and as the official  unemployment  rate stayed very low. The data 
show a large  decline in capital  goods production  but a large  increase in 
exports. There can be little doubt  that Mexican  growth  has slowed, but 
it is unclear  by how much, and it is also unclear  whether  there is excess 
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tion would take place in a weak labor market and not translate into much 
inflation, and perhaps it would not. The response depends on both orga- 
nized labor and the informal sector. 
Dornbusch and Werner are undoubtedly right to argue that a real de- 
valuation would help growth.  But that does  not establish  that Mexico 
should devalue. 
Should Mexico  Devalue? 
The bottom line of the paper is presented in table 12. I accept the diag- 
nosis that the problem is acute and that the desired real devaluation  is 
about 20 percent. There are then four options.  The first is to attempt to 
maintain the  current system  of  a slow  crawl,  perhaps  exploiting  the 
bands more than has been  done  so far; the  second  is to negotiate  an 
agreed devaluation  with the pacto  partners; the third is to undertake a 
stealth maxidevaluation;  and the fourth is to float. 
Continuation of the present  policy  has the advantage that it will,  if 
successful,  persuade  investors  of the benefits of buying Mexican  debt 
and add to the credibility of Mexico's  commitment to a stable exchange 
rate policy.  It has the disadvantages  that growth will take another year 
or two to return and that the policy may fail: at some point investors may 
lose their nerve and, by withdrawing their funds, bring on the devalua- 
tion that they fear. Still, by maintaining this policy, the Mexican govern- 
ment could  step up the rate of devaluation  within the band and try by 
agreement within the pacto  to crawl a bit faster,  thus hoping to bring 
about a gradual real devaluation. 
Second,  the Mexican government could try to negotiate a new pacto, 
one that starts with an agreed upfront devaluation and that then crawls 
fast enough to avoid creating a new overvaluation.  This approach would 
have two  disadvantages:  it would  disappoint foreign investors,  and it 
would probably be too small, say 10-15 percent rather than 20 percent. 
It has the advantage of maintaining domestic  economic  peace,  and the 
further benefit of bringing growth back sooner. 
The stealth maxidevaluation,  say 25 percent,  has the disadvantage 
that it would  be a major defeat  for the government's  proclaimed  ex- 
change rate policy: it would reduce government  credibility outside and 
inside the country. If it worked, it would bring growth back sooner but, 
if it failed, it could set off an inflation that would have to be fought with 
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The decision to float would also be a major  defeat that would reduce 
credibility  and  possibly  upset domestic  labor  relations.  Given  the size of 
capital  flows into and out of Mexico, it is difficult  to predict  where the 
exchange  rate  would settle; the float should  probably  be a dirty  one. 
Which  way should  Mexico go? It should  start  by trying  to negotiate  a 
new  pacto.  It seems unlikely  that  the labor  unions  would  agree  to a large 
real devaluation  (that  is, a nominal  devaluation  that is not compensated 
for by wage increases). In all likelihood, therefore, the government 
could not get more  than a 10-15 percent  agreed  devaluation.  I believe it 
should  aim for this outcome-secretly,  of course-and  should take the 
consequences  in terms  of foreign  loss of confidence.  In the end, foreign- 
ers will invest in Mexico because it is doing  well not because the govern- 
ment is pursuing  promises  that no longer  make  economic sense. 
But if no agreement  on a serious agreed  devaluation  is possible, then 
Mexico should  stay with its current  policies, crawling  as fast as possible. 
It may succeed, in which case it would gain on inflation  and lose on 
growth. It might  fail and be forced to devalue. Failure  would be better 
than  success. If the market  forces Mexico to devalue, then both foreign- 
ers and  domestic residents  will understand  that  the devaluation  was un- 
dertaken  reluctantly,  under  force majeure. That will help the govern- 
ment bring  about  the internal  adjustments  needed to ensure the success 
of the devaluation.  And foreign  investors too may be more forgiving  in 
this case. 
Credibility  is a slippery concept, which should not be overvalued. 
The Ginaudi  quote made  famous  by Dornbusch,  that investors have the 
heart  of a lamb, the memory  of an elephant, and the legs of a deer, has 
not been a good guide  to foreign  investment  behavior  in the 1990s.  It did 
not take 20 years after the debt crisis for capital flows to developing 
countries  to resume-in  some cases, like Brazil,  the capital  came in well 
before  the crisis was resolved. A successful 1994  devaluation  by Mexico 
would not keep foreign  investors away for long; protracted  slow growth 
in Mexico would. 
Exchange  Rate Anchors 
The Mexican  case, as well as that  of Argentina,  highlights  the benefits 
and costs of using the nominal  exchange rate to anchor a stabilization 
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held in place too long, often leads to overvaluation.  And then the pro- 
gram  may reach  the point at which its entire  credibility  rests on mainte- 
nance of an overvalued exchange rate. By that time, the stakes have 
been raised  too high, and  policymakers  have taken  excessive risks. 
Mexico should not have allowed the exchange rate to become over- 
valued. It should have crawled faster over the past few years, and it 
should have adjusted  the band with each new pacto.  Of course, it has 
suffered  from the capital  inflows problem  that has beset much of Latin 
America,  but  it might  have avoided  the trap  if it had  worried  more  about 
its growing  overvaluation. 
The lesson for the use of the exchange  rate  as a nominal  anchor  is sim- 
ple: the exchange rate makes sense as a transitional  nominal anchor, 
but, if the peg is maintained  too long, it poses real  dangers  to the survival 
of a stabilization  program.  After  a year  or two, the anchor  usually  has to 
be moved. This was done successfully in Israel, which first  used a fixed 
exchange  rate  for periods  of 6 to 12  months,  with small  devaluations  be- 
tween periods of fixity, and then moved to its diagonal-band  crawling 
peg system. The currency  did  appreciate,  but  that  appreciation  was fully 
consistent with the sustainability  of the current  account. That has not 
been the case in Mexico. 
General Discussion 
While many participants  agreed that the Mexican exchange rate is 
overvalued  and is impeding  growth, there were questions about  how to 
correct  it, what the consequences would be, and how the present situa- 
tion developed. Stanley Fischer questioned  whether  labor  could be ex- 
pected to accept a large devaluation,  even with the carrot  of a modest 
wage increase. And if they did not agree, it would create big political 
problems  within  the labor sector. In addition,  any discussion of a large 
devaluation  would start  a stampede  to get money out of the country. 
Dornbusch  replied  that, while he could not be certain  the present  la- 
bor leader  would accept the package  he proposed, it was likely that he 
would. He has been committed  to national  unity and  in the past has vol- 
unteered  wage restraint  to provide stability. Dornbusch  reasoned that 
time  would  only reduce  the chances of getting  the new package  accepted 
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to strike an economywide  deal as time passes.  Furthermore, he saw the 
chances of preserving the present exchange rate from speculative attack 
as lower than the chances  of selling devaluation with a new pacto,  thus 
making it worth a try even if success  is not assured. 
On the second point, Dornbusch was confident that a plan for devalu- 
ation and a new pacto  could be negotiated  quickly and secretly.  Busi- 
ness leaders would cooperate because they are so dependent on the gov- 
ernment  and would  keep  the pacto  negotiations  secret  for the  same 
reason. He noted, as an example,  the Mexican stock market's failure to 
anticipate the privatization of the banks, even though the president had 
a meeting with bankers beforehand. He therefore saw little risk of a run 
on the peso before the announced devaluation.  Werner added that a de- 
valuation, once accomplished,  was unlikely to lead to capital flight. He 
reasoned that the Mexican government  would not lose credibility from 
a devaluation,  because  it would  be  recognized  as  a constructive  re- 
sponse to a crisis. Furthermore, because  Mexico  is not confronting hy- 
perinflation, the situation is much more stable than it was in Argentina, 
where a devaluation led to economic  turmoil. The problem in Argentina, 
he explained,  was not the devaluation  itself,  but uneasiness  about the 
intentions of the incoming government.  Finally, once the devaluation is 
done,  there would no longer be a reason for investors  to leave because 
it would be too late to avoid losses.  Dornbusch added that historical ex- 
perience does not suggest that a disaster would follow the devaluation, 
citing the recent examples of Italy, Sweden,  and even Mexico itself with 
its recent 8 percent devaluation. 
James Tobin asked why going to a floating exchange  rate would not 
be a cleaner way to secure the needed currency alignment, particularly 
in light of all the difficulties  surrounding a decision  to devalue.  Dorn- 
busch responded  that floating would  pose  several  problems.  It would 
lose  the price-stabilizing  benefits of a fixed or predictable  sliding rate 
that was part of an incomes  policy with labor, like the present pacto.  It 
would violate the present pacto  and lose the trust that went with it. And 
currency instability in itself would be undesirable and could lead invest- 
ors  to  demand  high  interest  rates,  which  would  depress  the  real 
economy. 
Some  members  of  the  panel  argued  that  a  devaluation,  even  if 
needed,  should  not be taken immediately.  Guillermo Calvo  reasoned 
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ment  could secure  a commitment  to support  the new peso exchange  rate 
if necessary, even though  he was not confident  sufficient  support  could 
be obtained. Barry  Bosworth  pointed  out that the Mexican  government 
could lose a great  deal by negotiating  support  from  the U.S. Treasury  to 
defend the currency  because, ultimately,  such support  would be a loan 
that had  to be repaid  in dollars. 
Nora Lustig  questioned  the wisdom of an immediate  devaluation  be- 
cause of the political  situation.  Investor  confidence  is especially fragile 
ahead  of the upcoming  election and, in particular,  after  the assassination 
of the ruling  party's candidate  in March.  Also, the likelihood  that a de- 
valuation  can be negotiated  through  the pacto  is nil under the circum- 
stances. Lustig argued  that any change to the exchange rate should be 
done after the elections and that even then a step-wise devaluation 
should  be avoided. The best option  is to move to some form  of a floating 
rate and delink credibility in the government  from the peso's move- 
ments. 
Dornbusch  responded  that, in his view, the assassination  provides  a 
unique  window  of opportunity,  a moment  of "national  unity"  that  should 
be seized. And he reminded  the panel that the longer a devaluation  is 
postponed,  the greater  the risk  of a massive capital  outflow  and  a run  on 
the currency  in fear  of such a move. Thus, the belief  that  the government 
could devalue after  the election makes it important  to devalue before  it. 
Furthermore,  it would be much  worse if Mexico were forced to devalue 
by a speculative  attack  rather  than  on its own initiative.  In a speculative 
attack,  there  would  be no chance  of getting  a new  pacto  beforehand,  and 
the ensuing inflation  uncertainty  would cause investors to lose confi- 
dence. In an uncontrolled  devaluation,  he  judged  the rate  might  reach  30 
percent,  whereas  it might  be 12  percent  after  the controlled  devaluation 
he and Werner  advocate. 
The panel discussed the merits  of Mexico's strategy  of fighting  infla- 
tion. Lustig argued  that Mexico had turned  to the pacto  because other 
measures,  including  cutting  the government  deficit and pegging  the ex- 
change rate without an incomes policy, had been ineffective. Fischer 
said that Mexico had erred by keeping the exchange rate fixed for too 
long. He argued  that  a fixed  exchange  rate  is a good way to fight  inflation 
for a year or two, but after that the exchange rate should be allowed to 
crawl  at the rate of inflation.  But Bosworth pointed  out a built-in  prob- 
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until the currency becomes overvalued because that is when the ex- 
change  rate  exercises restraint  on domestic  wages and prices. 
Greg Mankiw  raised the possibility that the Mexican government's 
present  reluctance  to devalue simply reflects a higher  priority  for infla- 
tion than unemployment.  Fischer disagreed, noting that the govern- 
ment's own objectives included growth and securing  political succes- 
sion, both  of which  have beenjeopardized  by the mistake  of allowing  the 
real  exchange  rate  to appreciate  so much. Dornbusch  added  that, rather 
than reflecting  different national priorities, the reluctance to devalue 
now stems from political  judgments about the timing of a devaluation 
and  the technocratic  confidence  of the Mexican  government  in its ability 
to control  that  timing. 
Gary  Burtless drew attention  to a puzzle in the data that shows em- 
ployment  falling  at the same time that  industrial  output  is rising  strongly 
and nonoil exports are soaring, though from a small base. Burtless 
hypothesized-and  Dornbusch  agreed-that  this dichotomy likely re- 
flects rapid  growth  in the informal  sector, driven, in part, by the incen- 
tive to avoid the high  payroll  taxes in the formal  sector. The shift of em- 
ployment  from the formal  sector to the informal  sector would show up 
as a decline in measured  employment  with no change  in unemployment. 
Furthermore,  as firms  cut labor  costs by purchasing  intermediate  inputs 
from the informal  sector, output and productivity  measures would be 
unreliable,  because the inputs from the informal  sector would not be 
properly  counted. 
Jonathan Gruber suggested that privatization might help explain 
three surprising  developments:  the fall in employment,  the disappoint- 
ing productivity  numbers, and the consumption  boom. Newly privat- 
ized firms  would be likely to shed workers;  privatization  would  increase 
consumption  if it transferred  wealth  to the private  sector;  and  productiv- 
ity measurement could be distorted by production and accounting 
changes  as ownership  shifted  to private  hands. 
Responding  to these concerns about measurement,  Dornbusch  and 
Werner  noted  that  data  problems  would not alter  the broad  facts that  the 
exchange  rate  is overvalued  and  Mexico is in recession. Any measure  of 
the real exchange rate would reveal a considerable  peso appreciation 
from 1988  to 1993.  Even allowing  for a sizable margin  of error,  the em- 
ployment  numbers  would still show falling  employment.  And whatever 
the pace of growth  in the informal  sector, there is a problem  if the much 
larger  formal  economy is not growing. Rudiger-  Dor-nbusch and Alejandr-o Wer-ner-  313 
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